Basic Court of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Case № P 938/13 27 May 2015

# In the name of the people

The Basic Court of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica in the trial panel composed of EULEX judges: Dariusz Sielicki as the presiding trial judge, Vidar Stensland and Iva Niksic as panel members, assisted by EULEX Legal Officer Chiara Tagliani acting as recording clerk in the criminal case No. P 938/2013 against the following accused charged with the indictment No. PPS 88/11 filed with the Court by the prosecutor of the Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo on 8 November 2013:

	J.D. S.G.	<pre>, father's name H. , born on, , father's name S. , born on</pre>
	<u> </u>	
-	г.н. S.J.	<pre>, father's name S. , born on, , father's name H. , born on</pre>
5.	<u></u>	, father's name M. , born on
6.	<u> </u>	, father's name S. , born on
7.		, father's name H. , born on;

after the main trial held in public and in the presence of all the accused and their defense counsel, respectively: Haxhi Millaku for S.G. ; Thorsten Link until 14 October 2014 and Tahir Rrecaj for S.J. ; Mexhid Syla for J. D. , Tomë Gashi, Gregor Guy Smith, and Ibrahim Dobruna for S.S. ; Mahmut Halimi for I.H. ; Luljeta Ginovci until 24 September 2014, Dr. Ingo Risch until 4 December 2014; Arianit Koci from 24 September 2014 for S.L. ; and Gani Rexha for A.Z. ;

on the days: 22 and 23 May; 12, 13, 24, and 25 June; 8, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, and 24 July; 4 and 5 August, 17, 24, and 25 September; 7, 8, 14, and 29 October; 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, and 20 November; 3, 4, 5, and 11 December 2014; and on 15 January; 3 and 13 February; 10, 11, 19, and 24 March; and 22, 24, 28, and 29 April; 12, 19, and 25 May 2015;

after the trial panel's deliberation and voting held on 25 and 26 May 2015, on 27 May 2015, pursuant to the Article 359 Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Kosovo (CPCRK) in the presence of accused, their defense counsel, EULEX Prosecutor of the Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo Charles Hardaway, pronounces in public the following:

### VERDICT

- I. S.L. is guilty of the following criminal act: that acting in a brutal manner intentionally took the life of an unidentified \_\_\_\_\_ speaking \_\_\_\_ around \_\_\_\_\_ years old in such a way that \_\_ put a TT-type pistol to the 's head while the \_\_\_\_ had \_\_\_ hands tied and was guarded by \_\_\_\_ unidentified \_\_\_\_\_, and then fired shots in the 's head and thereby caused death, in an undetermined location between the villages of \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_, on an undetermined date in and this action is hereby classified as a murder under Article 30 Paragraph 2 Subparagraph 1 of the Criminal Law of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo of 28 June 1977 (CLSAPK), and for this crime, pursuant to Article 30 Paragraph 2 Subparagraph 1 of the CLSAPK and Article 38 Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (CCSFRY) in its wording as entered into force on 1 July 1977 whereas all these provisions were retained in force by Paragraph 1.1 (b) of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Regulation 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, is hereby sentenced to 12 (twelve) years S.L. of imprisonment;
- II. S.S. is guilty of the following criminal act: that, during the internal armed conflict in Kosovo, on several occasions, in \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, acting as a member of the \_\_\_\_\_\_ (\_\_), \_\_\_ seriously violated Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, because \_\_\_\_\_ intentionally perpetrated violence, cruel treatment, and torture against Witness A, a \_\_\_\_\_\_ civilian detained in the \_\_\_\_'s facility in \_\_\_\_\_/ (\_\_\_\_\_/ \_\_\_\_ municipality), who took no active part in hostilities, by beating with punches and slaps, (), inside the detention cell, and this action, pursuant to Article 33 Paragraph 1 of the

Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is hereby classified as a war crime in continuation under Article 152 Paragraph 1, Paragraph 2 Subparagraph 2.1, and Article 81 Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo that entered into force on 1 January 2013 (CCRK), in violation of Article 4 Paragraph 2 (a) of the Additional Protocol II to the said Conventions, and for this crime, pursuant to Article 152 Paragraph 1 and Article 45 Paragraph 1 of the CCRK modified by Article 33 Paragraph 2 of the Constitution and by Article 38 Paragraph 1 of the CCSFRY in its wording as entered into force on 1 July 1977 that was retained in force by Section 1 Paragraph 1.3 of the UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 of 12 December 1999 **S.S.** is hereby sentenced to 6 (six) years of imprisonment;

- It is established that during the internal armed conflict III. in Kosovo, on \_\_\_\_ occasion around \_\_\_\_\_\_ s. acting as a member of the intentionally violated G. the bodily integrity and the health of Witness B, an \_\_\_\_\_ civilian detained in the \_\_\_'s facility in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_ municipality), by beating \_\_\_\_ repeatedly with a baton; however this action did not demonstrate characteristic of a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as it was classified in the indictment and for this reason it did not constitute a criminal offence at the time of perpetration, and therefore, pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.1 of the CPCRK and Article 3 of the CCSFRY, S.G. is hereby acquitted of the charge consisting of this action;
  - IV. It is established that during the internal armed conflict in Kosovo, on \_\_\_\_\_ occasion between beginning of \_\_\_\_\_\_ and end of \_\_\_\_\_\_ J.D. and S. S. acting as members of the \_\_\_\_ and in coperpetration with each other, intentionally violated the bodily integrity and the health of an unidentified \_\_\_\_\_\_ from the \_\_\_\_area in \_\_\_\_\_, detained in the \_\_\_\_'s \_\_\_\_ facility in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_ municipality), by repeatedly beating \_\_\_\_\_\_up, in \_\_\_/\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_ municipality); however this action did not demonstrate characteristic of a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as it was classified in the indictment and for this reason it did not constitute a criminal offence at the time of perpetration, and therefore, pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.1 of the CPCRK and Article 3 of the CCSFRY, J.D. and S.S. are hereby acquitted of the charge consisting of this action;

- v. It is established that during the internal conflict in Kosovo, on \_\_\_\_ occasion in \_\_\_\_\_ S.S. acting as a member of the \_\_\_\_, in co-perpetration with another so far unidentified \_\_\_\_ member, \_\_\_ intentionally violated the bodily integrity and the health of an unidentified \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ from village detained in the \_\_\_\_'s \_\_\_\_\_ facility by beating \_\_\_\_ up while \_\_\_\_ was cleaning the floor of the , in / ( / municipality), however this action did not demonstrate characteristic of a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as it was classified in the indictment and for this reason it did not constitute a criminal offence at the time of perpetration, and therefore, pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.1 of the CPCRK and Article 3 of the CCSFRY, S.S. is hereby acquitted of the charge consisting of this action;
- VI. Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of the CPCRK S.G. and S.J. are hereby acquitted of the following count: that acting as the members of the \_\_\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_) and in coperpetration with each other and other so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_\_, they killed \_\_\_\_\_\_, a \_\_\_\_\_\_ by beheading \_\_\_\_\_ with a chain saw, in \_\_\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ municipality), on an undetermined date around \_\_\_\_\_\_ which count was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population provided for and punished by Articles 22 and 142 of the CCSFRY, because it was not proven that they committed the said action;
- VII. Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of the CPCRK S.G. and S.J. are hereby acquitted of the following count: that in their capacity

of members of the \_\_\_, in co-perpetration, they violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness C, a civilian detained in a \_\_\_\_\_ center located in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_ (\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ center), by repeatedly striking \_\_\_\_ with a baseball bat while **S**. **J**. kicked and punched \_\_\_, in \_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_ municipality), on an undetermined date around the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_ which count was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population, provided for and punished by Articles 22 and 142 of CCSFRY, because it was not proven that they committed the said action;

- VIII. Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of the CPCRK I.H. is hereby acquitted of the following count: that in \_\_\_\_ capacity of member of the \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_ violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness F, a civilian, by firing a pistol in the direction of Witness F's leg the very same shot wounding \_\_\_\_\_ leg, and then hitting \_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_ forehead with the pistol butt, in an undetermined location near village (\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ municipality) on an undetermined date in late \_\_/early \_\_\_\_\_ which was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population under Article 142 of the CCSFRY, because it was not proven that he committed the said action;
  - Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of IX. the CPCRK **S.J.** , S.L. , A.Z. and are hereby acquitted of the following S.S. count: that in their capacity as \_\_\_\_ members and persons exercising control over the \_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ (conditions, regulations, and the persons to be detained and/or released), in co-perpetration with each other, they violated the bodily integrity and the health (e.g. prisoners chained, premises inappropriate, excessive heat, lack of sanitation, inadequate nutrition, frequent beatings) of an undefined number of \_\_\_\_\_ civilians, detained in such \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_/ (\_\_\_\_/ \_\_\_ municipality), from until the first months of , which was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population under Article 142 of the CCSFRY

because it was not proven that they committed the said action;

- Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of Χ. the CPCRK **S.J.** is hereby acquitted of the following count: that in \_\_\_\_ capacity of member of the , in co-perpetration with an undetermined number of other persons, \_\_\_\_ repeatedly violated the bodily integrity and the health of \_\_\_\_\_, a \_\_\_\_\_, held captive at the hands of the ; more precisely, the defendant participated in the crime by taking on several occasions \_\_\_\_\_ to the market square in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_, by announcing publicly that whoever wanted to beat \_\_\_\_\_ could do so, and by keeping the victim at the disposal of an undetermined number of persons who slapped and hit , in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ municipality), on several undetermined dates in early \_\_\_\_\_ which count was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population, provided for and punished by Articles 22 and 142 of CCSFRY, because it was not proven that they committed the said action;
- Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of XI. the CPCRK S.J. , S.L. , A.Z. are hereby acquitted of the following action: that in their capacity of members of the , in co-perpetration with each other and with another identified person now deceased, and three so far unidentified , they violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness F, a civilian detained in the  $\__/\_$ \_\_\_\_\_, by repeatedly kicking \_\_\_, in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_/ municipality), on an undetermined date in early \_\_\_\_\_ which was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population under Articles 22 and 142 of the CCSFRY, because it was not proven that **S.J.** , S.L. , A.Z. committed the said action;
- XII. Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of the CPCRK S.J. is hereby acquitted of the following count: that in \_\_\_\_ capacity of member of the \_\_\_\_, )\_\_ repeatedly violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness E, a civilian detained in an annex

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building of the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, over a period of approximately \_\_\_\_\_\_, including by flogging \_\_\_\_\_with car chains, in \_\_\_\_\_\_, (\_\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_\_, which was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population under Article 142 of the CCSFRY, because it was not proven that **S.J.** committed the said action;

- XIII. Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of the CPCRK S.J. is hereby acquitted of the following count: that in \_\_\_\_\_ capacity of member of the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ in co-perpetration with other so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ violated the bodily integrity and the health of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ of the bodily integrity and the health of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, detained in an annex building of the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, detained in an annex building of the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, who were severely beaten up, in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, who were severely beaten up, in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, which was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population under Article 142 of the CCSFRY, because it was not proven that S.J. committed the said action;
  - XIV. Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of the CPCRK S.J. and S.S. are hereby acquitted of the following count: that in their capacity of members of the \_\_\_, in co-perpetration with each other they violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness I, a civilian detained in the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_, by repeatedly beating \_\_\_, in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ municipality), on an undetermined date in late \_\_\_\_\_/early \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_, which was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population under Article 142 of the CCSFRY, because it was not proven that S.J. and S.S. committed the said action;
    - XV. Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of the CPCRK A.Z. is hereby acquitted of the following count: that in \_\_\_\_ capacity of member of the \_\_\_\_, in co-perpetration with \_\_\_\_ so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_ violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness F, a civilian detained in the \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_\_, who was beaten with sticks; more precisely, the defendant participated in the crime by keeping the victim at the direct disposal of the \_\_\_\_\_\_so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_\_, who beat Witness F and by reinforcing their criminal intent with \_\_\_\_\_\_presence in \_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_(\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_municipality), on an undetermined date in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_which action was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population under Articles 22 and 142 of the CCSFRY, because it was not proven that **A.Z**. committed the said action;

- Pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.3 of XVI. the CPCRK **A.Z.** is hereby acquitted of the following count: that in \_\_\_\_ capacity of member of the \_\_\_\_, in co-perpetration with \_\_\_\_\_ so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_ violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness F and an unknown prisoner from \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_ civilians detained in the \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ by repeatedly beating them, in \_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_/ municipality), on an undetermined date in \_\_\_\_\_ which action was classified in the indictment as a war crime against the civilian population under Articles 22 and 142 of the CCSFRY, because it was not proven that **A.Z.** committed the said action;
- XVII. Pursuant to Article 83 Paragraph 1 of the CCRK the period of deprivation of liberty of S.S. from 24 May 2013 until 19 December 2014 shall be credited for the punishment of imprisonment imposed on \_\_\_;
  - Pursuant to Article 7 and Article 50 Paragraph 1 of the CCSFRY the period of deprivation of liberty of S.
     L. from 23 May 2013 until 19 December 2014 shall be credited for the punishments of imprisonment imposed on \_\_\_;
  - **XIX.** Pursuant to Article 453 Paragraph 3 of the CPCRK, the cost of the criminal proceedings shall be partially reimbursed by:

- S.S.	in a	a s	cheduled	amount	t of	Eu	ro 12	200;
- S.L.	ir	n a	schedule	ed amou	ınt	of I	Euro	1200;

while any remaining cost of the criminal proceedings shall be paid from the budgetary resources.

# REASONING

### A. Procedural Background and Actions

### I. The indictment

- 1. On 08 November 2013 the EULEX Prosecutor of the SPRK
  filed an Indictment no PPS 88/11 dated 6 November 2013.
  S.L. , S.G. , S.J. , J.D.
  , S.S. , I.H. , A.Z. were charged
  with various criminal acts. The defendants allegedly
  acted in their capacity of members of the \_\_\_\_ during the
  internal armed conflict in Kosovo in \_\_.
- 2. Most of the charges consisted of violation of bodily integrity and health of civilian prisoners that were allegedly kept in \_\_\_'s \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_. In particular:

2.1. **S.S.** was accused of:

2.1.1 violation of the bodily integrity and the health of Witness A, by beating \_\_\_\_\_ on an undetermined number of occasions, not fewer than \_\_\_\_\_, with punches and slaps inside the cell where \_\_\_\_\_ was detained, on several undetermined dates in \_\_\_\_\_\_ (count 13(2) of the indictment);

- 2.1.2 violation of the bodily integrity and the health of an unidentified person from \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_village, by beating \_\_\_\_ up while \_\_\_\_\_was cleaning the floor of the prison, in co-perpetration with another so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_ member, on an undetermined date in \_\_\_\_\_\_ (count 13(5)of the indictment);
- 2.2. **S.J.** was accused that:
  - 2.2.1 \_\_\_\_\_repeatedly violated the bodily integrity
    and the health of Witness E, over a period of
    approximately \_\_\_\_\_, including by flogging
    \_\_\_\_\_\_with car chains, on undetermined dates in
    early \_\_\_\_\_(count 11(6) of the indictment);
  - 2.2.2 in co-perpetration with other so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_\_ violated the bodily integrity and the health of \_\_\_\_\_ so far unidentified civilians, a \_\_\_\_\_ and a \_\_\_\_\_\_, detained in an annex building of the \_\_\_\_\_\_, who were severely beaten up, on undetermined dates in early (count 11(7) of the indictment);
- 2.3. S.J. and S.S. were accused that in co-perpetration with each other they violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness I, by repeatedly beating \_\_\_\_, on an undetermined date in late \_\_\_\_/early \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_(counts 11(8), and 13 (7) of the indictment);
- 2.4. J.D. and S.S. were accused that in co-perpetration with each other they violated the bodily integrity and the health of an unidentified \_\_\_\_\_\_ from the \_\_\_\_\_\_ area in \_\_\_\_\_\_, on an undetermined date between beginning of \_\_\_\_\_\_ and end of \_\_\_\_\_\_ (counts 6(3), and 13(6)of the indictment);

- 2.5. S.G. and S.J. were accused that in coperpetration with each other , they violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness C, by repeatedly striking \_\_\_\_\_ with a baseball bat while S.J. kicked and punched \_\_\_\_, on an undetermined date around the beginning of (counts 9(2), and 11(2)of the indictment);
- 2.6. S.J. , S.L. , A.Z. were accused that in their capacity of members of the \_\_\_\_, in coperpetration with each other and with \_\_\_\_\_\_ (now deceased), and \_\_\_\_\_ so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_\_, they violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness F, by repeatedly kicking \_\_\_\_\_, on an undetermined date in early \_\_\_\_\_\_. More precisely, S.L. and A.Z. participated in the crime by keeping the victim at the direct disposal of the other perpetrators, who beat Witness F and by reinforcing their criminal intent with \_\_\_\_\_ presence (counts 11(5), 12(2), and 15(2) of the indictment);
  - 2.7. S.G. was accused of violation of the bodily integrity and the health of Witness B, by repeatedly beating \_\_\_\_\_ with a baton around \_\_\_\_\_\_ (count [9(3) of the indictment);
  - 2.8. **A.Z.** was accused that in co-perpetration with two so far unidentified :
    - 2.8.1. \_\_\_\_\_\_violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness F, who was beaten with sticks; more precisely, the defendant participated in the crime by keeping the victim at the direct disposal of the \_\_\_\_\_ so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_\_, who beat Witness F and by reinforcing their criminal intent with \_\_\_\_\_\_ presence on an undetermined date in \_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ (count 15(3) of the indictment);

- 2.8.2. \_\_\_\_\_\_violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness F and an unknown prisoner from \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ by repeatedly beating them, on an undetermined date in \_\_\_\_\_\_ (count 15(4) of the indictment).
- 3. The indictment contained two charges related to violation of bodily integrity of civilians that allegedly took place in location other than \_\_\_\_\_\_ in / :
  - 3.1. I.H. was accused that \_\_\_\_\_ violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness F, a civilian, by firing a pistol round in \_\_\_\_\_ leg and then hitting \_\_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ forehead with the pistol butt, in an undetermined location near \_\_\_\_\_\_ village (\_\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_ municipality) on an undetermined date in late \_\_\_/early \_\_\_\_\_\_ (count 10(1) of the indictment);
  - 3.2. **S.J.** was accused that in co-perpetration with an undetermined number of other persons, \_\_\_\_\_\_ repeatedly violated the bodily integrity and the health of I.B. , a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ held captive at the hands of the \_\_\_\_; more precisely, the defendant participated in the crime by taking on several occasions I.B. to the market square in \_\_\_\_\_\_, by announcing publicly that whoever wanted to beat I.B. could do so, and by keeping the victim at the disposal of an undetermined number of persons who slapped and hit \_\_\_\_, in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (count 11(3) of the indictment).

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and the persons to be detained and/or released), in coperpetration with each other, violated the bodily integrity and the health (e.g. prisoners chained, premises inappropriate, excessive heat, lack of sanitation, inadequate nutrition, frequent beatings) of an from \_\_\_\_\_\_ until the \_\_\_\_\_ months of (counts 11(1), 12(1), 13(1), and 15(1) of the indictment).

- 5. There were also charges that consisted of killings:
  - 5.1. S.G. and S.J. were accused that in coperpetration with each other and other so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_, they killed I. B. , a \_\_\_\_\_ by beheading \_\_\_\_ with a chain saw,in \_\_\_/\_\_(\_\_/\_\_\_\_ municipality),on an undetermined date around \_-\_\_\_(counts 9(1), and 11(4) of the indictment);
  - 5.2. **S.L.** was accused of killing an unknown civilian prisoner, by shooting times in the head with a TT pistol, in an undetermined location between the villages of and \_\_\_\_\_, on an undetermined date in \_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_(count 12(3) of the indictment).
- 6. All these acts were classified in the indictment as War crimes against the civilian population provided for and punished by Article 142 of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (CCSFRY) currently criminalized under Articles 31 and 152 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo (CCRK), in violation of Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Article 4 of Additional Protocol II to these Conventions, whereas all the above quoted rules of international law were indicated by the prosecutor as effective at the time of the internal armed conflict in Kosovo and at all times relevant to the present indictment. The legal classification of the acts

that were allegedly committed in co-perpetration consisted also of Article 22 of CCSFRY.

7. The same indictment consisted of two more charges that were later on severed with the ruling of the presiding judge dated 14 April 2014, in order to be heard in other proceedings.

7.1. The first of them was described as follows:

A.D. , S.S. , I. T. , Z. D. , F.D. , N.D. , S.D. , D.D. , B.D. , and J.D. were also accused of: the following act that in coperpetration with each other and with so far unidentified \_\_\_\_\_ members, they violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness A and Witness B, \_\_\_\_\_\_, by:

- beating them with fists and wooden sticks;
- forcing Witness A and Witness B to beat each other;
- pinching Witness A's genitals with an iron tool and subsequently dragging on the floor with it,

on an undetermined date in \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_•

7.2. By the second charge that was also subject of the above mentioned Ruling on severance, J.D. , S.S. , I.T. , and Z.D. were accused of the following act: that in co-perpetration with each other and other so far unidentified members, on an undetermined number of occasions, they violated the bodily integrity and the health of Witness A, a civilian detained in the /\_\_\_\_\_, by beating \_\_\_\_\_ with fists and wooden sticks on various parts of \_\_\_\_\_\_ body, on several undetermined dates in \_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_

### II. Objections to the indictment

### III. Competence of the court and panel composition

- 9. In accordance with Article 11 Paragraph 1 of the Law on Courts, Law No. 03/L-199, basic court has jurisdiction to adjudicate at first instance all criminal offences.
- 10. The criminal offences, according to the indictment, were committed in the region of \_\_\_\_\_ which is in the territory of the Basic Court of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. Therefore, in accordance with Article 29 Paragraph 1 of CPCRK, this court has territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.
- 11. The case was investigated by the Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo; therefore, according to Article 3.1 of the Law No. 03/L-053 of 13 March 2008 "Law on Jurisdiction Case Selection and Case Allocation of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo"<sup>1</sup>, EULEX judges have competence and jurisdiction over this case.
- 12. According to Article 286 of the CPCRK main trial should be held at the place where the court has its seat, and in the courthouse.

<sup>1</sup> Law is approved by Assembly, date 13.03.2008 and promulgated by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kosovo No. DL-019-2008, date 15.06.2008.

- 13. On 15 May 2014, the President of the Basic Court of Mitrovice/a rejected the motions filed by defence counsel Dr. Ingo Risch on 2 May 2014; Haxhi Milaku, Mahmut Halimi, Mexhit Syla, Tahir Rrecaj and Gani Rexha on 7 May 2014; and Gregor Guy Smith on 8 May 2014. The defence counsel Luljeta Gjinovci also filed a motion requesting a change of venue on 15 May 2014. This motion was rejected with the decision of the President of the Mitrovica Basic Court issued on 20 May 2014. On 23 June 2014, the defence counsel Gregor D. Guy-Smith filed another motion for change of venue, which was also rejected by a decision of the President of the Mitrovica Basic Court dated 26 June 2014.
- 14. The prosecutor presented his motion for the change of venue during the hearing on 22 May 2014. The panel refused to consider it due to the lack of subject matter competence, pursuant to Article 286 of the CPCRK.
- 15. It is a notorious fact that since March 2008 until the day the judgment was rendered because of specific security requirements in the north of Mitrovice/Mitrovica there has been firmly established practice that criminal cases in the Basic Court of Mitrovice/Mitrovica are tried by panels composed exclusively of EULEX Judges. This practice has never been contested by courts of anv instance. Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as well as Article 31 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo provide for a right to fair trial by tribunal established by law. The notion of "tribunal established by law" refers also to domestic legislation on territorial and factual jurisdiction. It appeared that exclusive participation of EULEX judges was the only way to observe the right to court.
- 16. Such practice was also reaffirmed in the Agreement between the Head of the EULEX Kosovo and the Kosovo Judicial Council on relevant aspects of the activity and cooperation of EULEX Judges with the Kosovo Judges working in the local courts (the 'Agreement'), of 18 June

2014, whereby under section 5 (a), the Agreement states that "EULEX Judges will ensure that the Basic Court of Mitrovica remains operational, until the multiethnic court system in the North is implemented and operational."

17. No issue was raised by the parties regarding the composition of the trial-panel. Therefore it is presumed that according to Article 382 Paragraph 4 of the CPCRK they waived the right to challenge the composition.

### IV. Main trial

- a. Duration of the main trial
- 18. The main trial commenced on 22 May 2014 and was concluded on 25 May 2015. It was heard on 46 trial days. At the opening session of 22 May 2014 the accused S.J. , I.H. and S.L. did not appear. The proceedings were therefore severed against them in accordance with Article 36 Paragraph 1 of the CPCK. Since the mentioned accused appeared at the next session on 23 May 2014, the proceedings were then joined again.
- 19. The sessions scheduled for 09 October 2014, 12, 16 and 17 December 2014 and 05, 06 and 07 March 2015 were cancelled upon request of the parties. The sessions of 16 July 2014, 25 September 2014 and 24 March 2015 had to be adjourned because of health conditions of some defendants. All requests were justly reasoned and, therefore, granted.
- 20. Due to unusual length of testimonies of witnesses for the prosecution the duration of the main trial exceeded the period of 120 calendar days prescribed in Article 314 Paragraph 1.2 of the CPCRK. However; each subsequent adjournments ordered by the trial panel did not exceed 30

days and were always reasoned by indication of procedural actions to be taken during the next court session.

21. The parties did not raise objection to the duration of the trial. Therefore, pursuant to Article 382 Paragraph 4 of the CPCRK it has been presumed that they waived the right to challenge this matter.

# b. The court facilities

22. Due to the significant number of participants and members of the public interested in observing the proceedings special arrangements were made in order to accommodate the trial in a proper way. The courtroom was properly furnished with pieces of furniture commonly used in Kosovo and it was air-conditioned. The size of the courtroom allowed for enough space for the parties, for around 80 seats reserved for the public, and also for room for TV cameras. The members of each defense team, it means defendants, their lawyers, and persons assisting the lawyers were seated together; each defense team sat at a separate bench in order to allow for confidential communication within the team.

# c. Measures taken to ensure public access to the courtroom and Public character of the trial

23. The access of the public was facilitated by announcing trial dates during each of the court sessions and additionally on the EULEX Web page. Kosovo Police assisted members of the public in reaching the courtroom. There were no security incidents related to members on the public movements in the North of Mitrovice/Mitrovica reported. No complaints on limitation or hindrance of the access to the courtroom were presented to the trial panel.

- 24. The trial was held in open court. Besides the exclusion of the possibility for the members of the public to see the face of a witness heard by videoconference (as detailed below), there were following exceptions to the public character of the trial:
  - 24.1. The session was closed for the public because of the issues pertinent to witness' protection in the following instances:
    - on 13 June 2014, when the prosecution's motions on protective measures for witnesses was discussed;
    - on 5 August 2014 during the testimony of witness
       F.M. due to a risk that he would reveal
       Witness A's identity;
    - on 12 November 2014 for the part of Witness D's testimony that related to Witness G;
  - 24.2. The needs for protection of the witness' right to privacy were recalled by the trial panel when reasoning closing the session to the public on two occasions:
    - on 29 October 2014 when Witness M's health status was discussed;
    - on 13 March 2015 for the testimony of \_\_\_\_ G. H. on Witness A's mental status.

### d. Security in the courthouse

25. There were normal security measures typical for the high profile cases in Kosovo applied during the whole trial. These involved bans on bringing large objects to the courtroom, and personal checks with metal detector at the entrance to the courthouse. Kosovo Police officers were present in the courtroom. There were no security incidents in the courthouse reported.

### e. Medical assistance

26. As already mentioned above, due to the numerous health issues raised by some of the defendants public emergency medical service in Mitrovice/Mitrovica was arranged in advance to facilitate swift assistance.

### f. Presence of the parties

- 27. The EULEX prosecutors of the Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo, the accused and their defence counsel were present on all trial days.
- 28. The injured parties Witness A, Witness B, Witness C, Witness E, Witness F, Witness G, Witness I, and M. B. were duly informed about the trial and about their respective procedural rights, and that the main trial may be held in their absence but they did not execute their rights of a party during the trial.

# g. Language of the proceedings, interpretation and court recording

- 29. Based on Article 16 of the Law on Jurisdiction and competencies of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo, the language used in the court proceedings was English.
- 30. In accordance with Article 1 Paragraph 2 of CPCRK, interpreters translated the court proceedings and all court documents relevant to the trial from English into Albanian and vice-versa. During the first two days of the trial translation into Serbian language was provided to the members of the public. On other days the Serbian translation was not requested by the public. Most of the interpretation was performed in a consecutive manner. The speakers were asked by the presiding judge to make

intervals in their utterance, usually every 1 to 3 minutes and as a principle at the end of the complete thought, and then the interpreter rendered what was said into the target language. This method allowed parties to control accuracy of interpretation of all evidence taken in the courtroom.

- 31. On some occasions the parties raised objections to the quality of translation. All the objections were immediately given consideration by the trial panel and the clarification was put in the record.
- 32. Closing arguments of the parties and the announcement of the enacting clause of the judgment were translated simultaneously into English, Albanian, and Serbian.
- 33. On 22 May 2014, according to the decision of the presiding judge taken pursuant to Article 315 Paragraph 2 and 5 of the CPCRK, the record of the proceedings was made verbatim in writing and without audio, video or stenographic recording because the time used for translation allowed the court recorder to accurately capture and write down all words spoken in the courtroom. As a matter of fact, on 15 May 2014, in writing, the defense counsel Gregor Guy Smith requested that audio and video recording of the proceedings was to be made. His motion was supported by Counsel Haxhi Milaku on 22 May 2014 and rejected by the Trial Panel with the 22 May 2014 Ruling. On 13 November 2014, the defense counsel Guy-Smith again requested a verbatim transcript. During the same session, the Trial Panel rejected this motion by affirming in full the ruling given on 22 May 2014.
- 34. Accuracy of the written record was controlled by the presiding judge in real time. The computer screen displaying the record was placed in front of him. This manner of recording made use of other recording methods redundant as it appeared unlikely to achieve any better accuracy of the semantic content of the record.

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#### h. Protective measures

- 35. On 24 June 2014 pursuant to Article 222 Paragraph 1 and Article 339 Paragraph 3 of the CPC the Trial Panel ordered the protective measures in relation to the witnesses proposed by the prosecution. It was decided that:
  - 35.1.the \_\_\_\_\_ of Witness A, the \_\_\_\_\_ of Witness A, the \_\_\_\_\_ of Witness B, the \_\_\_\_\_ of Witness F, and the \_\_\_\_\_ of Witness F, would be granted the following pseudonyms: K, L, M, N and O;
  - 35.2.witnesses A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I , J and witnesses
    K, L, M, N and O would be heard by video-link from a
    remote location without distortion of their face's
    image;
  - 35.3.the names, addresses, places of work, information on profession or any other data or information that could be used to identify these witnesses, should be expunged from court documents available to the parties;
  - 35.4.any records identifying these witnesses should not be disclosed;
  - 35.5.the defense counsel, defendants and any other person in possession of information on identities of the witnesses were ordered not to disclose any information that might lead to the disclosure of the their identity;

- 35.6.media and the public could remain in the courtroom during testimonies of the said witnesses but without possibilities to see the faces of witnesses;
- 35.7.no audio or video recording of the testimonies would be allowed.
- 36. Following the order, personal data of the said witnesses was omitted and expunged from the court documents, and the statements of the protected witnesses were taken by video link with the witnesses being placed in a remote location and without exposing their faces to the public. Namely, the following Witnesses were heard through videoconference due to the security concerns: Witness A, Witness B, Witness D, Witness I, Witness L, Witness N, and Witness O.
- 37. Witness F and Witness C insisted on giving a statement in the open court in person, so the panel withdrew from the use of videoconference.
- 38. The identity of all the witnesses that were given pseudonyms was known to the parties, but not the public and parties were placed under an obligation not to reveal it.
- 39. Witnesses E, G and M did not appear for trial due to their unavailability. Witnesses G and M were diagnosed as not being able to participate in judicial proceedings.<sup>2</sup> Witness E is currently residing out of Kosovo and \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated to be unwilling to travel to Kosovo to testify. No measures could be taken by the Court to ensure \_\_\_\_\_\_ presence in the proceedings, due to lack of bilateral agreements between Kosovo and the country witness E has \_\_\_\_\_\_ residence on such judicial matters.

<sup>2</sup> See expert medical report of 08 January 2015.

40. The panel considered ex-officio protective measures for witness N.F. and witness K.H. . However, after preliminary hearings of the witnesses conducted by the presiding judge<sup>3</sup> without the presence of the parties, no protective measures were imposed as the witnesses declared that they were not likely to present any facts that might trigger any hostility against them.

### V. Principles applied for questioning witnesses

# a. Leading, provocative, badgering and other similar questions

- 41. As a principle, leading questions on direct examination were not allowed by the presiding judge. The only exceptions were permitted when recollection of facts by the witness was obviously exhausted, when there was a need to focus witness's attention on a particular matter, or when the question touched upon a matter being undoubtedly of a common knowledge.
- 42. The prosecutor objected to the ban on asking leading questions on direct examination arguing that the CPCRK does not contain such a ban.<sup>4</sup> This objection was rejected with the following clarification presented by the presiding judge:

"Leading question is a question that suggests the particular answer or contains the information the examiner is looking to have confirmed. Leading questions cannot be asked in direct examination because we want the answer to be given by witness spontaneously."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See hearing minutes of 17 and 19 February 2015.

<sup>4</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 22 July 2014 p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 22 July 2014 p. 16.

- 43. Provocative, suggestive, and repetitive questions were also not allowed at this stage.
- 44. Badgering or insulting a witness, as well as misquotation of previous statements, was not permitted during all examination.

### b.Questions on witness protection program

45. The panel decided not to allow any questions related to witness protection, other than questions strictly related to the motivation of the witness to give testimony and that were asked by the panel.<sup>6</sup> The following reasoning was presented for this decision:

"We will ask the questions that will give a clear understanding if witness motivation was somehow based on the benefits that might come from the witness protection program. First of all we take a notice that all elements called witness protection program of the SO are determined by the law on witness protection adapted by assembly of Republic of Kosovo on 29th July 2011. We are well aware of all benefits that the witness may be granted. We are also aware that the list of these benefits is dynamic. Usually the witness is informed what kind of measures may be applied and even if not applied today they might be imposed in the future. One of the benefits that may be granted is financial support determined in Article 12 of the said law. That means when protected person has no financial source to maintain a minimum standard financial support may be granted, but up to this limit: to ensure a minimum living standard. We have also observed Article 30 of the said law. Any detail of any agreement constitutes an official secret. Disclosure of an official secret comprises a criminal

<sup>6</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 17 July 2014 p. 7.

act. So it is determined by law that details of agreement cannot be revealed in the courtroom. It is not up to the court to decide if this ban can be somehow waived. There is a special procedure; the court may apply to the committee on witness protection for disclosure of such secrets but we take presumption that some benefits may be granted to the witness, presently or in the future. It is a common understanding that when we deal with the witness who may expect some benefits there is a always a risk that this is the main motivation to give testimony."

### c. Questioning by judges

46. The panel participated actively in questioning of the witnesses at various stages of examination. However, the parties were always given an opportunity to challenge the answers given by the witness in response to a judge's question. The panel based its activity in questioning on the conclusion that Article 7 Paragraph 1 of the CPCRK obliges judges to seek an objective truth. Therefore, a meticulous clarification of all factual matters that appear to the judges to be unclear was necessary. Article 299 Paragraph 1 of the CPCRK entitles the judges to pose questions to any witness but it does not indicate any particular stage of examination. It appears that the code does not impose any limitations with relation to the time of interrogation by judges.

# d. Hostile witness

47. The Trial Panel allowed the prosecutor to declare some of the witnesses for the prosecution as hostile and to examine them without limitations that are usually applied during direct examination with relation to asking leading questions and to the use of pre-trial statements. The parties instructed that were witnesses' previous direct statements would, however, not be used as evidence. The following instruction was given on 17

September 2014 with relation to hostile witness concept applied by the court: $^{7}$ 

"The institution of hostile witness is not provided for by the Kosovo Procedural Code. However, we are bound by European Convention on Human Rights so we must provide for equality of arms for both sides. The Kosovo criminal procedure imposes on the parties quite a far going limitations while examination in chief is taking place.

The lawyers do not need a lecture on it but I will explain for the public. The main limitation is the use of witness' previous statements that are inconsistent with testimony given in the courtroom. On direct examination you can use the previous statement just to refresh the witness's memory, not to look for explanation on discrepancies. This you can do on cross examination; there is the logic of the adversarial system behind it. It is based on assumption that the witness which is sponsored by the party would present the evidence in accordance with the thesis presented by the party. In situation the criminal procedure gives the such sponsoring party opportunity to prove the fact and at the same time the regime of cross examination allows the opposing party to challenge it. In the situation when the witness sponsored by a party is actually contradicting her, the said limitation deprives the party of the opportunity to challenge witness credibility. It appears as a clear violation of the principle of equality of arms. This situation is not regulated by Kosovo procedure therefore we have to use the instruments we know from the theory of criminal procedure. It is like a Defense Counsel bringing in a witness that would suddenly start to accuse his client; of course the Defense Counsel must challenge the credibility of the witness.

There are two ways of dealing with a hostile witness applied in trial practice in the countries that apply the adversarial model of proceedings. The first is that the party that sponsors the witness does not call him to the stand anymore; then the witness is called ex-officio and the party can do cross examination and challenge credibility of his evidence. The other way is just to declare a witness hostile and it is clear that the purpose of examination is to challenge credibility and not to prove facts. This is why I instructed the party that we would apply this institution of hostile witness here to preserve equality of arms. That means that in our situation the Prosecutor may challenge the credibility of the witness by questioning without the usual limitations;

<sup>7</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 17 September 2014 p. 4.

meaning: leading questions are allowed as well as confronting the witness with his previous statement."

- 48. The following witnesses sponsored by the prosecution were declared to be hostile: Witness C, Witness I and Witness L. The prosecutor's motion to declare also Witness F as hostile was refused as it came after direct examination was already completed.
- 49. On 24 July 2014, the defense counsel Tahir Recaj objected to the use of the hostile witness concept for interrogation of witnesses. This objection was rejected by the panel during the same session of 24 July 2014. Defense counsel Guy-Smith, Ingo Risch and Mexhid Syla objected to the use of the hostile witness concept on 05 August 2014. These objections were rejected by the panel during the same session of 05 August 2014. On 17 September 2014, the defense counsel Tahir Rrecaj again objected arguing that this concept is not grounded in law, joined in by the Defense counsel Ibrahim Dobruna. The Trial Panel rejected this objection during the same session. On 19 November 2014, the defense counsel Tahir Rrecaj and Guy-Smith again objected. During the same session, the Trial Panel confirmed and reiterated in full the decisions previously given on this subject matter.

### e. Videoconference

## i. rationale

50. The use of videoconference was legitimized in a reasoning of the ruling imposing the protective measures:<sup>8</sup>

"The court assessed the values protected by the right to public trial, the right to defense and equality of arms

<sup>8</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p. 3.

and the right of the witnesses to their personal safety. And it tried to strike a balance. The court assessed that a balance will be reached by the way highlighted in the enacting clause.

In fact, the video-link with the screen giving its back to the public is authorized because, although the court asserted that the witnesses names and personal data are already known to the defense, disclosing such identity to the public and asking for their physical appearance in court would increase the risk of retaliation and would place the witnesses in danger of concrete intimidation.

Due to the sophisticated nature of the video-link equipment, the defense will anyway be able to engage in any cross-examination using demonstrative evidence or to present or add any documents for use with the witnesses at the location of the video-link."

### ii. equipment

51. The equipment used for videoconference allowed the panel members and the parties in the courtroom to see the witness sitting in the remote location from the waist upwards. The witness was able to see the person interrogating \_\_\_\_ with the camera zoomed on face and upper part of the body of the person asking questions. Two-way audio communication in real time was maintained between witnesses and persons in the courtroom. The sound was synchronized with the image. There was a 54- inch screen installed in the courtroom for the parties and for the panel. The screen was placed with its back facing the public so the public could not see the interrogated person but could only hear \_\_\_.

### iii. Assistance in the remote location

52. Each witness testifying in the remote location was assisted by a EULEX legal officer or EULEX judge. Their role was exclusively to confirm the identity of the witness and to present the witness with an exhibit used in evidence if needed. Their presence was also meant as a safeguarding to make sure that the witness testified without duress or other undue influence. No such occurrence was reported by any of the assisting persons.

53. During the testimony of Witness B there was an interpreter present with \_\_\_\_\_ in the remote location due to the witness' hearing problems. All other witnesses were questioned with a help of interpreter present in the courtroom.

### iv. Objections

- 54. In its Ruling dated 24 June 2014, the Trial Panel further stated that an individual assessment would have been done before hearing each individual Witness.
- 55. On 24 June 2014, with regard to Witness A, the defense counsel Gregor Guy Smith objected to taking the witness's statement through videoconference, arguing that, when asked, the witness expressed \_\_\_\_\_\_ willingness to appear in the courtroom in person. On 25 June 2014, the Defense Counsel Ingo Risch raised the same objection. On 08 July 2014, defense counsel Ingo Risch and Guy-Smith again sustained this objection defining it as a 'continuing objection'. On 11 November 2014, the defense counsel Guy-Smith again objected due to the lack of sufficient actual basis for the imposition of these measures.
- 56. These objections were rejected by the Trial Panel after assessing the circumstances for each Witness. The Trial Panel reaffirmed on all occasions its initially given ruling.

## f. Parties' objections to procedural actions taken by the trial panel

- 57. On 02 May 2014, the defense counsel Syla submitted a motion for joinder of proceedings. On 22 May 2014, the Trial Panel asserted how the severance of proceedings was already decided and substantiated and no appeal was possible against this ruling at that stage of proceedings.
- 58. On 12 June 2014, the Defence Counsel Ingo Risch objected to the rejection of the Trial Panel to conduct a closed session on health issues of defendants. The Panel reasoned that the medical expert would have provided an independent expert medical report on the health of the Defendants, and there was no need to hold a closed session on it. On 05 August 2014, the Trial panel reinstated the reasoning based on which the requested was rejected and how such decision is not appealable.
- 59. On 25 June 2014, the Defense Counsel Ingo Risch requested to be present at the remote location where Witness D would have testified from. This motion was supplemented on 27 June 2014. On 22 July 2014, the Defense Counsel Ingo Risch motioned for an expert Witness to be present at the remote location during the interrogation of Witness D through videoconference, in case his motion to be present at such remote location would have been rejected. This motion was followed by another motion/response filed on 06 November 2014 by Guy-Smith, who requested the presence of all defense counsel at the remote location in case Risch's motion would have been approved, and also that a psychological expertise of Witness D be conducted to deem whether is competent to The Defense Counsel Tahir Rrecaj also supported testify. Risch's motion. On 11 November 2014, the Trial Panel rejected this motion based on the following reasoning:

"The panel finds that it is the competence of the court to ensure the witness is duly identified and that he testifies without any unlawful influence or duress. It should be stressed that the authorized member of the court staff is present with the witness all the time, either a judge or legal officer. This is a general practice applied in the international mutual assistance when the video conferencing is used". With regard to the assessment of the body language, the trial Panel stated that "Today's technique allows observing the witness' body language. And of course it is up to the panel and not to the Defense Counsel to make any assessment of witness' non-verbal communication. Due to the nature of video link equipment, both parties have the right to have the possibility to question the witness properly". "Concerning the request to have the Defense Counsel \_ \_\_\_\_ to observe the witness during the

breaks at remote location, the trial panel see neither legal ground nor common sense justification. There are already measures taken by the Panel to ensure the witness gives testimony freely and without undue influence". With regard to the challenges to the witness' credibility, "The trial panel found that this is an exclusive competence of the trial panel to assess the credibility of the witness. The panel cannot be replaced in this role by any expert witness. The motion does not consist of any concrete and specific challenge to the witness competency The court practice allows for psychiatric examination of the witness only if there are reasons to believe that mental or physical impairment may affect ability to perceive recollect, explain or correctly relate the facts. The prima facie assessment of the pre-trial statement of the witness D does not give grounds to such a conclusion. This is of course said without any prejudice to the credibility or truthfulness of statement".

60. On 27 June 2014, the Defense Counsel Ingo Risch submitted a motion requesting the continuation of Witness A interrogation in the Courtroom. On 05 August 2014, the Trial panel rejected the motion asserting that the decision had already been taken on 24 June 2014 when the Trial Panel confirmed to hear the Witness via video-link, and such decision was properly reasoned and was not appealable at this stage of proceedings.

61. On 01 July 2014, the defense Counsel Ingo Risch filed another motion in relation to Witness A, challenging the Witness's credibility by alleging that lied in relation to \_\_\_\_ place of stay. On 05 August 2014, the Trial Panel rejected this motion stating that "the law does not provide any confidential way of communication between the Defense Counsel and the panel unless there are serious security measures not related to the subject of the proceedings. In this motion, the Defense Counsel challenging Witness A's credibility because is the counsel got information about witness's place of stay. I cannot see the subject of the request. There will be time for closing statements and comments on credibility of evidence".

### g. Other Evidentiary motions

- 62. On 28 January 2015, the Prosecution motioned in writing for a new Witness to be summoned and for the public to be excluded. On 03 February 2015, the Trial Panel granted the motion, but rejected the request for exclusion of the public and allowed instead the use of an opaque shield.
- 63. On 28 January 2015, the Prosecution motioned in writing to have the pre-trial statements of Witnesses M and G read in court and to be adduced as evidence in the case file. On 03 February 2015, the Trial panel rejected this motion based on the following reasoning: "The new procedural code implemented some safequards to be enjoyed by the defendants. They consist of the ban to use a testimony that could not be challenged by questioning. The distinction between testimony and interview is a new solution that came into force since January 2013 and it was unknown previously. So, we share the opinion presented by the appellate court in socalled "MTPT Case" (MTPT 1, PN 577/2013, of 10 December 2013) that we must apply interpretation imposed by the new code to all procedural actions taken under the regime of the old one"..."...under the new code, testimony

is a witness's statement taken in the presence of defence counsels. This is not the case with relation to the Witness G and Witness M and their statements. Therefore, the use of pre-trial statement is not admissible. There was a very challenging remark made by the Prosecutor, that the provision of Article 262 of the new code refers to ban on using statement that were not challenged by questioning, as a sole and decisive. According to the Prosecutor, this may lead to the conclusion that if the evidence is not sole and decisive than it could be used even if it has not been challenged by questioning. Otherwise this provision seems to be redundant. However, the Trial Panel asserts that in case inconsistencies of such in the system, the interpretation in case of doubts should be done in favour of the defendants".

64. On 10 April 2015, the Prosecution filed a motion to adduce new evidence. On 22 April 2015, the Trial Panel rejected the request to introduce as evidence the trial statements given by Witnesses A and B in P 58/14, and it rejected the request to summon the Witness M.B. , since this request came too late in the proceedings and, anyway, it would not be relevant to the elements of the alleged crime. The Trial Panel also rejected the request to introduce the testimony of witness S.P. given before the ICTY chamber, since the information coming from a witness should be presented in front of the court in a form of testimony, as well as the request to adduce as evidence the spotlight report Nr. 27 of the Humanitarian Law Centre dated 05 August 2008 and a printout from the International Committee of the Red Cross Web page in relation to M.B.

### h. Evidence examined in Court

- 65. The following pieces of evidence were presented to the Trial Panel and adduced into the evidence:
  - Exhibit :medical paper related to Witness A, submitted by Witness L during the hearing session of 23 July 2014
  - Exhibit \_: envelope containing name of Witnesses written  $\overline{b}y$  Witness D, during the session of 11 November 2014;
  - Exhibit :drawing made by Witness D during the session of 12 November 2014 and envelope containing a further name written by the Witness;
  - Exhibit : envelope containing name of Witnesses written by Witness D, during the session of 13 November 2014;
  - Exhibit \_: pictures submitted by defense counsel Millaku on 24 March 2015 in relation to the treatment that **S.G.** underwent in \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_, and also in \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_;
  - Exhibit : The Application for filed by Witness A, presented in criminal case P 58/14 and introduced into the case file of P 938/13 on 24 March 2015.

66. The following Witnesses were heard by the Trial Panel:

- Witness A on 24 and 25 June 2014, 08, 16, 17 and 18 July 2014;
- Witness K on 22 July 2014;
- Witness L on 23 and 24 July 2014, and on 04 August 2014;
- Witness F.M. on 05 August 2014 and on 17 September 2014;
- Witness F on 24 and 25 September 2014, and on 07 October 2014;
- Witness N on 08 October 2014;
- Witness O on 08 October 2014;
- Witness B on 14 and 29 October 2014;
- Witness D on 11, 12, 13 and 18 November 2014;
- Witness I on 19 and 20 November 2014;
- Witness F.B. on 03 December 2014;
  Witness B.G. on 04 December 2014;

-	Witness C on 05 and	11 December 2014;
-	Expert Witness C.B.	on 15 January 2015;
-	Witness C.S.	on 03 February 2015;
-	Witness A.G.	on 13 February 2015;
-	Witness H.H.	on 13 February 2015 and on 10
	March 2015;	
-	Witness J.L.	on 11 March 2015;
-	Witness N.F.	on 11 March 2015;
-	Witness K.H.	on 11 March 2015;
-	Witness G.H.	on 19 and 24 March 2015.

All the defendants used their right to remain silent.

# B. Determination of the factual situation

67. The facts relevant to the counts that the defendants were tried for in this case were established by the trial panel as a result of analysis and assessment of all pieces of evidence examined in the courtroom.

### I. Repetitive beating of Witness A by S.S.

68.On		/	around						
	са	me in a	jeep l	ike v	ehicle	to Wi	itness	A ł	nouse
in a	villag	e in the		_ regi	ion. Tl	hey ca	lled _		30
went	outsid	e. They	told _	tha	at the	y had	an or	der	from
		S	S.S.		th	at wit	tness	A sł	nould
come	to	/	to	give	a st	tateme	nt. T	hey	also
info	rmed	that	_ would	be r	elease	d afte	r havi	ng q	given
the	stateme	nt. Witn	ess A d	did no	ot kno	w them	n. One	of	them
intro	oduced	himself	as F.G	•		Both			wore
			that	Witn	ess A	recogi	nized	as	' s
		out	fits. 1	'hey c	arried	l autor	matic	guns	and
	2	Witness		0	cily k	boarded	d the	veł	nicle

69. The \_\_\_\_\_\_ asked Witness A if \_\_\_ knew where Witness B's house was. Witness A led them to Witness B's house. They

<sup>9</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p. 14-15.

stopped the vehicle near Witness B's house and they told Witness A to get out of the car. Following \_\_\_\_\_' command, Witness A called Witness B to come to them. The \_\_\_\_\_\_ informed Witness B that, by **S.S.** order, \_\_\_ had to come with them and give a statement. Witness B and Witness A got into the vehicle and the \_\_\_\_\_ took them to \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>10</sup>

- 70.Upon arrival to \_\_\_\_, Witness A and Witness B were placed in separate rooms, in the building that was used by the \_\_\_\_\_. The building was used as a \_\_\_\_\_ before the war. The roof of the building was burnt.<sup>11</sup>
- 71. The room that Witness A was put in was around 4 by 4 meters, and it looked like a detention cell. It had a window with bars and which was located close to the ceiling. There was a wooden bed and some chairs there. There were chains attached to the bed legs.<sup>12</sup> The doors were kept locked with a key from outside.<sup>13</sup> Outside the room there were \_\_\_\_\_ armed \_\_\_\_\_ guarding the door.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p. 16.

<sup>11</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p.17.

<sup>12</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p. 16. 13 Minutes of the main trial; 8 July 2014 p. 10, and 16.

<sup>14</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 8 July 2014 p. 15.

<sup>15</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p. 18.

<sup>16</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 6.

X. refused saying that further clarification was needed.  $^{\rm 17}$ 

- 73. Approximately \_\_\_\_\_ later, another \_\_\_\_\_ named S.S.1 entered the room and threw Witness A on the floor. Immediately after, \_\_\_\_\_ other persons came. \_\_\_\_\_ of them had their faces painted. They kicked Witness A, who was lying on the floor, and they accused \_\_\_\_\_ of being \_\_\_\_\_\_'s friend. Witness A lost consciousness.<sup>18</sup>
- 74. On the same day, after some time had lapsed, in the evening, **S.S**. came to the room.19 \_\_\_\_\_ was wearing civilian clothes.<sup>20</sup> Witness A did not know \_\_\_\_\_\_ introduced himself to Witness A as "\_\_\_\_\_\_". Witness A was still lying on the floor. **S.S**. grabbed \_\_\_\_\_ by a collar and put \_\_\_\_\_ on the bed. Then **S.S**. slapped Witness A few times with an open hand, punched \_\_\_\_\_ few times with a fist, and told \_\_\_\_\_ that \_\_\_\_ would beat \_\_\_\_\_ with a stick to bring \_\_\_\_\_ back to consciousness. While assaulting Witness A, **S.S**. kept saying that Witness A was a \_\_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_. It lasted a few minutes.<sup>21</sup>
- 75. The next afternoon, **S.S.** came to Witness A alone and repeated the accusation of Witness A being a \_\_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ threatened Witness A that \_\_\_\_\_\_ would be killed for this reason.<sup>22</sup>
- 76. Similar actions were repeated by **S.S.** during the next days. Sometimes \_\_\_\_\_ was coming to Witness A's room twice a day. On some occasions **S.S**. used

<sup>17</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p. 18.

<sup>18</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p.6.

<sup>20</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 11.

<sup>21</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 6.

<sup>22</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 11.

to call Witness A a \_\_\_\_\_ and on some occasions \_\_\_ was also slapping and beating \_\_\_\_. ^{23}  $\,$ 

- 77. After three nights, another person was placed in the same room with Witness A. \_\_\_\_\_ name was F.M. \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_ told Witness A that \_\_\_\_ was imprisoned because \_\_\_\_ was a supporter of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. Some days later, a \_\_\_\_\_ called H.M. \_\_\_\_\_ was put in the same room. F. M. \_\_\_\_\_ told Witness A that \_\_\_\_ was wounded with a gunshot by \_\_\_\_\_\_ after having had a quarrel with them, and \_\_\_\_\_ was imprisoned after this incident.<sup>24</sup>
- 78. Five days later H.M. was released from incarceration. Sometime later F.M. was also allowed to leave.<sup>25</sup> Five or six days from Witness A's arrival to \_\_\_\_\_\_, another \_\_\_, a \_\_\_\_\_\_, another \_\_\_, a \_\_\_\_\_\_ named G.V. , was placed in the room with \_\_\_\_. told Witness A that \_\_\_ was incarcerated because \_\_\_ wanted to marry a girl without her parents' consent and they complained to \_\_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_. G. V. was kept in one room with Witness A until the end of Witness A's stay in \_\_\_\_\_\_.
- 79. Several times **S.S.** came to the room and shouted at Witness A in the presence of other persons kept there. However, \_\_\_\_ never beat Witness A in the presence of H.M. and F.M. . Several times \_\_\_ came in the afternoon and slapped witness A in \_\_\_\_ face in the presence of G.V. .

<sup>23</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 11.

<sup>24</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 12-13.

<sup>25</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 14.

<sup>26</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 17.

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80. On one occasion, Witness A and an unidentified \_\_\_\_\_ from the village of \_\_\_\_\_\_ were ordered to clean some other rooms in the building that Witness A was kept in. The \_\_\_\_\_ was severely beaten by some \_\_\_\_\_\_ while doing the cleaning. S.S. was present during the beating but \_\_\_\_\_ did not actively participate in it. This happened 3-4 days before Witness A's release from \_\_\_\_\_\_.<sup>27</sup>

# III. Beating of an unknown \_\_\_\_\_ from \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ (S.S. , J.D. )

81. One day \_\_\_\_\_ brothers from a place called \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ were put in the room together with Witness A. S.S. came to the room. \_\_\_\_asked the brothers why they sold \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ instead of giving them to \_\_\_\_. The next day S.S. came again, this time with J.D. and they beat one of the brothers with punches and kicks. They did it in turns for around \_\_\_\_\_minutes. After that they took the brothers away from the room. There was no evidence proving what happened to the brothers later on.<sup>28</sup>

#### IV. Beating of Witness B (S.G. )

82. Shortly after, Witness B was brought to \_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ mass placed in the same building as Witness A but in another room.<sup>29</sup> Around \_\_\_\_\_\_, S.G. came to this room. \_\_\_ had difficulties in \_\_\_\_\_. was heavily wounded in combat at the \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ and underwent serious surgery.<sup>30</sup> From the \_\_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>27</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 23.

<sup>28</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 24.

<sup>29</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 14 October 2014 p. 14.

<sup>30</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 4 December 2014 p. 19.

\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_ was treated in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_. had a plaster cast applied. The cast immobilized \_\_\_\_ wounded \_\_\_\_.

83. At the \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ , **S.G.** 's ability to \_\_\_\_\_\_ was limited but \_\_\_\_\_ was able to \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>32</sup> \_\_\_\_ also moved in a \_\_\_\_\_\_.<sup>33</sup> But this time \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ in the room using a \_\_\_\_\_\_ kept under \_\_\_\_\_\_. Witness B did not know \_\_\_\_\_ at this time. **S.G.** asked \_\_\_\_\_ why \_\_\_\_\_ was objecting to \_\_\_\_\_ and beat \_\_\_\_\_ for a few minutes with a baton in various parts of the body including the head and then left the room. As a result of this beating Witness B bled from the ear.<sup>34</sup>

# V. Other facts related to charges referring to events that took place in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_

- 84. Before Witness A was taken to \_\_\_/\_\_\_ there were numerous attacks launched by \_\_\_\_\_ that included heavy artillery shelling of villages in \_\_\_\_\_ region. Also \_\_\_/\_\_\_ was already bombed in the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_\_.<sup>35</sup> \_\_\_\_ were engaged in \_\_\_\_\_-type actions against \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>36</sup>
- 85. There were refugees from neighboring villages seeking shelter in Witness A's village. \_\_\_\_\_\_ village was attacked by \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_\_\_. Witness A did not participate in hostilities. \_\_\_\_\_\_ was not a member of \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>37</sup> After the war, \_\_\_\_applied for \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ as a person supporting and helping \_\_\_\_\_ members, by way of sheltering them and providing them with other assistance.

<sup>31</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 3 December 2014 p. 6, 10 March 2015 p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 23.

<sup>33</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 8 July 2014 p. 11.

<sup>34</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 14 October 2014 p. 9.

<sup>35</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p.14,11 November 2014 p. 14.

<sup>36</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 13.

<sup>37</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p. 14.

- 86.Until \_\_\_\_\_ S.S. was a \_\_\_\_\_ of the \_\_\_\_\_ in the \_\_\_\_\_ operational zone. Then, \_\_\_\_ was replaced in this position by S.L. and became a \_\_\_\_\_\_ of the \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>38</sup> S.J. was a \_\_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_.
- 87. On several occasions Witness A was taken by \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ from the room that \_\_\_ was kept in, to a bigger room. \_\_\_\_\_ was beaten there by various persons.<sup>40</sup> On one occasion \_\_\_\_\_ was maltreated together with Witness B by many \_\_\_\_\_. This happened around 3 days before Witness A was released from \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_.<sup>41</sup> The details of these beatings were subject of the count that was severed and tried in other proceedings.
- 88. As a consequence of the beatings that Witness A suffered in \_\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ sustained various injuries: bruises all over the body including the head, 2 broken ribs, a wound in the \_\_\_\_\_\_.<sup>42</sup> There were no grounds to attribute particular injuries to the actions performed solely by S.S. that were a subject of the charge against in this case.
- 89. During the stay in incarceration, Witness A was receiving food once a day and \_\_\_\_\_\_ suffered from hunger. For the first three days \_\_\_\_\_\_ was given only bread and water. After that \_\_\_\_\_\_ was fed with little quantity of pasta once a day. One of the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ used to secretly give \_\_\_\_\_\_ some bread and told \_\_\_\_\_\_ that S.S. would execute \_\_\_\_\_\_ for doing it if \_\_\_\_\_\_ knew.<sup>43</sup> Witness A was allowed to use the toilet once a day and \_\_\_\_\_\_ was not given opportunity to wash. There was excessive heat in the room and the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ guarding the door did not allow \_\_\_\_\_\_ to open the door to get some fresh air inside.<sup>44</sup> One time a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

38 Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 10. 39 Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 19. 40 Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 18. 41 Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 20. 42 Minutes of the main trial; 15 January 2015 p. 8. 43 Minutes of the main trial; 8 July 2014 p. 19. 44 Minutes of the main trial; 8 July 2014 p. 20. named N.G. passed to Witness A clean clothes brought by Witness A's \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>45</sup>

- 91. Neither Witness B, nor the brothers from \_\_\_\_\_ nor the man from \_\_\_\_\_\_ served in the \_\_\_, nor did they participate in the hostilities.(presumption adopted by the panel).
- 92. Witness A was released from \_\_\_/\_\_\_ on \_\_ or \_\_\_ when the \_\_\_\_\_ offensive started. \_\_\_\_ R.S. \_\_\_\_\_ R.S. \_\_\_\_ opened the door and let Witness A and G.V. \_\_\_\_\_ go. Witness A returned by foot to \_\_\_\_\_ home village.<sup>46</sup>
- 93. S.S. and J.D. used to ask each other on several occasions in Witness A's presence "if they should \_\_\_\_\_\_ with a chainsaw like it happened to I.B. ".47
- 94. Once \_\_\_\_\_ of the \_\_\_\_\_\_ threatened to kill Witness A with a gun. J.D. stopped the \_\_\_\_\_\_ and told \_\_\_\_\_ that they were not going to execute Witness A, but only to beat \_\_\_\_\_. Witness A heard this remark. Another time J.D. said to Witness A that they would kill and take \_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. Witness A heard those remarks.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 8 July 2014 p. 11.

<sup>46</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 8 July 2014 p. 18.

<sup>47</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 20.

<sup>48</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 18.

- 95. While staying in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_ Witness A never saw S. L. , I.H. nor A.Z. and \_\_ did not hear anything related to them.<sup>49</sup>
- 96. Witness B stayed in \_\_\_\_\_ until an undetermined day in \_\_\_\_\_, however there was no evidence that could allow the panel to establish facts related to \_\_\_\_\_ stay and \_\_\_\_ release with the exception of one occasion when \_\_\_\_\_ was maltreated together with Witness A, and one occation when \_\_\_\_\_ was beaten by S.G.
- 97. During \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, stay in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, through the window of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ room, Witness A saw S.J. being present there. However, S.J. never mistreated \_\_\_\_\_\_. Witness A never saw S.J. mistreating other persons.<sup>51</sup>
- 98. Besides G.V. , who stayed in the same room with Witness A until they were both released, F.M. , and H.M. , there were other persons imprisoned in \_\_\_\_\_\_ during Witness A's stay there. Those were \_\_\_\_\_ brothers from \_\_\_\_\_, a man from a place called \_\_\_\_\_\_, and an \_\_\_\_\_ man from the village of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, and a \_\_\_\_\_ from \_\_\_\_.<sup>52</sup> There were no grounds to establish how long they stayed there and how they were treated.

99. One day between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_\_, there was a group of between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_ persons being imprisoned in \_\_\_\_\_\_. They were kept in two rooms, \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ people in one room. The doors were guarded by \_\_\_\_\_\_. One of them was Witness G, a \_\_\_\_\_\_. There was no piece of evidence indicating the nationality of the others and how long they were kept there and if they were abused in any way other way than

<sup>49</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 15 July 2014 p. 15.

<sup>50</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 20.

<sup>51</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 16 July 2014 p. 3.

<sup>52</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 25 June 2014 p. 24.

incarceration. There were also no grounds to establish if they participated in hostilities between the \_\_\_\_\_ population and \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>53</sup>

## VI. Killing of an unknown \_\_\_\_\_ (S.L. )

100. Witness D was a \_\_\_\_\_ of the \_\_\_\_ and the \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ village.<sup>54</sup> \_\_\_\_ was reporting about the situation in the neighborhood to S.L. \_\_\_\_\_ was related to S. L. \_\_\_\_\_ by marriage: \_\_\_\_\_ father in law was a brother of S.L. \_\_\_\_\_ 's father.<sup>55</sup>

101. One evening, in the end of \_\_\_\_\_ or beginning of \_\_\_\_\_, Witness D came to **S.L**. 's \_\_\_\_'s \_\_\_'s \_\_\_'s \_\_\_\_'s \_\_\_\_\_town overnight.

102. The next day in the afternoon, S.L. told
Witness D to accompany \_\_\_\_\_ in the 4-wheel drive vehicle.
S.L. drove. Witness D sat in the front
passenger's seat. There were no other persons with them.
S.L. was armed with AK-47 type assault rifle and
TT-type pistol and \_\_\_\_\_ wore a \_\_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_
on it. Witness D was in civilian clothes and \_\_\_\_\_\_
also had AK-47 type rifle. They logged approximately a
distance of \_\_\_\_\_\_ in the direction of \_\_\_\_\_.

103. Between villages \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_, S.L.
stopped the car. They went outside the vehicle. S.
L. smoked a cigarette. There was a \_\_\_\_\_ at the
\_\_\_\_\_ side of the road and in front of them there was a
small forest.

<sup>53</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 27, 31.

<sup>54</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 11. 55 Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 14.

- 104. In a short time \_\_\_\_\_ dressed in \_\_\_\_\_ appeared. Both of them were armed. They came out of the forest.<sup>56</sup> They were escorting a \_\_\_\_ year old \_\_\_.<sup>57</sup> \_\_\_ was a \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>58</sup> The \_\_\_ had \_\_\_ hands tied in front of \_\_\_\_ with a wire that caused bleeding.<sup>59</sup>
- 105. The \_\_\_\_\_\_ held \_\_\_\_ by the arms from both of \_\_\_\_\_ sides. In some moments they dragged \_\_\_\_\_ and in some others \_\_\_\_\_walked on \_\_\_\_\_own. \_\_\_\_wore civilian clothes. When they approached **S.L**. one of the escorting \_\_\_\_\_said to \_\_\_\_, referring to the escortee: "this is the person".<sup>60</sup>
- 106. Witness D stayed close to the vehicle. S.L. moved a few meters in front of \_\_\_\_\_ and approached the escortee. The escortee genuflected.<sup>61</sup> At the distance that was close enough to extend a hand with a pistol and to touch the escortee's head with it, S.L. put a pistol to \_\_\_\_\_ head behind the left ear. The escortee cried and said in \_\_\_\_\_\_ dialect "don't kill me, please." At that moment the \_\_\_\_\_\_ that were so far holding the escortee by \_\_\_\_\_ arm, stepped a couple of steps away. S.L. fired a shot and after that fired \_\_\_\_\_ more shots into the escortee's head.<sup>62</sup> After that the escortee fell on the ground. The shots deprived of life (presumption adopted by the panel.

107. The \_\_\_\_\_\_ took the body away to the forest.<sup>63</sup>
S.L. and Witness D boarded the vehicle and S.
L. drove it to \_\_\_\_. On the way S.L.
told Witness D that \_\_\_\_\_ killed the victim because this \_\_\_\_\_\_
took a gun from S.L. 's cousin named A.
L. and murdered \_\_\_.<sup>64</sup> This was not the truth as

56 Minutes of the main trial; November 2014 p. 46-47. 57 Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014, p. 47. 58 Minutes of the main trial; 12 November 2014, p. 8. 59 Minutes of the main trial; 12 November 2014, p. 4. 60 Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 49. 61 Minutes of the main trial; 12 November 2014, p. 4. 62 Minutes of the main trial; 12 November 2014, p. 11. 63 Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 41. 64 Minutes of the main trial; 12 November 2014 p. 7. A.L. died under different circumstances (testimony of J.L. ). There was no evidence indicating if **S.L**. deliberately lied or if \_\_\_\_\_ was mistaken.

#### C. Assessment of evidence

- I. Evidence used as a basis for reconstruction of facts
  - a. Evidence fully reliable
- 108. The trial panel based the majority of its factual findings on the testimonies of Witness A, Witness K, and Witness D.

#### Witness A

- 109. Witness A and \_\_\_\_, Witness K, spoke in the way typical of persons not educated in narrating a story. It was clearly noticeable that they were not used to presenting a cogent and sequential account of events. This resulted in omissions and gaps which in the opinion of the trial panel can be attributed to the lack of the witnesses's reporting skills rather than to deliberate The court took into consideration that the lying. testimonies of the said witnesses were clearly consistent in relation to the presented facts despite their rather limited ability to put their report in a clear and structured order. After meticulous reciprocal comparison of testimonies given by Witness A and Witness K, the trial panel came to the conclusion that in relation to essential elements all these pieces of evidence fully corroborated and confirmed each other.
- 110. The testimony of Witness A was decisive for the reconstruction of events that took place in \_\_\_\_\_.

- 111. There were no doubts as to the witness's abilities to perceive, recollect and present facts that he witnessed. The issue of presumed mental disorder, which the Witness might suffer from, was brought to the attention of the panel by the medical certificate dated (exhibit \_) and by the testimony of G.H. . The panel applied meticulous scrutiny to the content of Witness A's statements in order to exclude the possibility of delusions being presented as facts.
- 112. Witness A's version of events was found to be believable. It did not contain any elements that would be contradicted by general knowledge or common sense. Moreover, it was internally consistent and, therefore, it was credible. There were no discrepancies in narration although the witness was repetitively asked about the same issues. The witness understood questions and \_\_\_\_\_\_ answer corresponded to the matters that \_\_\_\_\_\_ was interrogated about.
- 113. The defense lawyers presented some challenges to Witness A's credibility.
- 114. Counsel Tahir Recaj argued that the witness described **S.J.** 's \_\_\_\_\_ as \_\_\_\_\_ although \_\_\_ wore a \_\_\_\_\_. Actually, the black uniform was mentioned in this context by Witness D.
- 115. Also Counsel Gregor Guy Smith argued for improbability of **S.S.** wearing civilian clothes as described by the witness. Nevertheless, the contested fact seemed to be of marginal significance as the common sense does not exclude a temporary non-adherence to the habit of wearing particular apparel.

- 116. Counsel Mexhit Syla referred to the conflict between the witness and D. \_\_\_\_\_\_ and the witness's potential jealousy towards the D. \_\_\_\_\_. He also indicated prospective benefits that might result from the status of protected witness as a possible motivation that lured Witness A to testify falsely. These arguments were taken into consideration by the panel, but they were found to be a kind of speculation and did not deny Witness A's credibility.
- 117. The story presented by Witness A indicates various degrees of emphasis applied by the witness to the actions of particular perpetrators. There seems to be a natural proportion between the suffering he sustained and the attention paid to individual culprits.
- 118. Witness A's recollection of dates seemed to be correct. \_\_\_\_\_\_indicated that \_\_\_\_\_was taken to \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_and it is a notorious fact that this date was indeed a \_\_\_\_\_. All the dates that \_\_\_\_\_ mentioned reflected the chronological order of the events that \_\_\_\_\_described.
- 119. None of the facts presented by Witness A was denied by any other piece of evidence that was found by the panel as trustworthy: testimony of Witness K, testimony of Witness D and expert opinion of C.B.

### Witness K

120. Witness K confirmed that \_\_\_\_\_ Witness A was taken from their home by \_\_\_\_\_, that \_\_ stayed away from home for almost a month and that \_\_ came home injured. \_\_\_\_\_\_description of the injuries corroborates Witness A's statement. \_\_\_\_\_ recollection of \_\_\_\_\_ recount on what happened to \_\_\_\_\_\_in \_\_\_\_ and that \_\_\_\_\_ heard from upon \_\_\_\_\_\_return, corresponds with the account of events that Witness A presented in the court. Witness D confirmed that there were rooms located in the \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_ /\_\_\_ and that they were used by the \_\_\_\_ as holding cells and they were guarded by .

- 122. After detailed comparison of the statements of both witnesses, the panel concluded that they concentrated on various facts and circumstances and used different description of the same events. It excluded impression that they concocted their statements in order to compliment or corroborate each other.
- 123. Witness K did not confirm that the \_\_\_\_\_ who took Witness A from home mentioned **S.S**. 's orders, as Witness A said. The panel took it as an indication that Witness K did not tend to portray **S.S**. as the main perpetrator of \_\_\_\_\_'s grievance.
- 124. \_\_\_\_ did not mention **S.S.** spontaneously, but \_\_\_\_\_ referred to \_\_\_\_ only after being asked questions that directed \_\_\_\_\_ to focus on the person mentioned by \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ and recalled only the pseudonym ``\_\_\_\_\_" that \_\_\_\_\_ heard from \_\_\_\_\_\_.
- 125. At the same time it seems natural due to the time lapse that \_\_\_\_\_ recollection of the circumstances surrounding the moment of \_\_\_\_\_\_ being taken away from home, and especially the recollection of references to S. S. 's order, is not as complete as that presented by Witness A, who communicated with the \_\_\_\_\_ directly.

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- 126. Judicial experience shows that omissions in detailed narrations presented by an eyewitness after a long time usually differ as various persons attribute different importance to the same details.
- 127. Witnesses A's and D's statements were mutually corroborated in relation to the fact that the rooms in \_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ were used by the \_\_\_\_\_ as \_\_\_\_\_\_ facilities.
- 128. Witness A's statement stayed in conformity with observations and findings presented by expert witness C. B. According to the expert witness, the scars might result from injuries that were shown or described by Witness A to \_\_\_\_\_ or that \_\_\_\_\_ learned from M. G. report and that might be inflicted in the way that, by the opinion of the panel, fully complies with the witness's statement.
- 129. It is a general observation that forensic expert opinions are often based on hearsay, i.e. on the anamnesis coming from the injured party. The panel noted that in this case the anamnesis had been verified: the description of the scars and their origin given to C.B. by Witness A during examination fully corresponded with Witness A's statement given in court.
- 130. The panel noticed a discrepancy between statements of Witness A and witness K and the results of x-ray examination performed by C.B. that related to the number of broken ribs that Witness A suffered from. The difference appears not as a result of deliberate misstatement of Witness A and \_\_\_\_\_, but is rather a consequence of their lack of medical knowledge and diagnostic skills.

131. Another discrepancy was related to the characteristic of the wound in the \_\_\_\_\_\_. Witness A referred to the wound as being an "open" one. According to the result of the examination that took place on 21 September 2012, the wound was healed with a visible scar. Again, the discrepancy was attributed by the panel to Witness A's limited linguistic skill that was noticeable as \_\_\_\_\_ used simple and non-nuanced expressions.

#### Expert Witness C.B.

\_\_\_\_\_

- 132. The panel fully accepted the findings and conclusions presented by the expert witness. The witness's expertise in the field of forensic medicine was firmly established by presentation of \_\_\_\_\_\_ academic background and professional experience. \_\_\_\_\_\_ based \_\_\_\_\_\_ findings on the medical examination that \_\_\_\_\_\_ performed personally with the exception of the examination of the wound located in the genital area of Witness A's body. \_\_\_\_\_ gave a detailed report of this examination. The panel had no doubts as to the credibility of \_\_\_\_\_ report and accurateness of opinion given in court on 15 January 2015.
- 133. The examination completed by M.G. was also fully credible. \_\_\_\_ presented a clear, precise and detailed description of \_\_\_\_\_ findings and there were no doubts as to \_\_\_\_\_ qualifications as a forensic doctor.
- 134. The conclusion that only the scar in the \_\_\_\_\_ could be associated with a single particular action that Witness A was subjected to while in \_\_\_\_\_, was made by the panel on the basis of B.'s opinion. The expert witness gave a very general indication as to the potential origin of the scars on Witness A's body. This indication was neither specific nor unique for any particular beating that was recalled by the witness, except the only occasion when \_\_\_ was pinched in \_\_\_\_

135. The general assessment that C.B. 's opinion corroborated Witness A's testimony was not impaired by \_\_\_\_\_assertion that the said scars might derive from events other than those presented by the witness. The corroboration in this case was neither conclusive nor decisive, but the opinion did not discredit the witness in any way. Therefore it was the logic, the coherency and the absence of non-conformity with other credible evidence that contributed to the positive evaluation of the probative value of Witness A's and Witness K'S testimonies.

#### Witness D

- 136. The panel found Witness D's testimony as fully credible. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_spoke in a logical way. \_\_\_\_\_\_modulated \_\_\_\_\_\_emotions adequately to the degree of traumatizing content in the description of events that \_\_\_\_\_\_witnessed. \_\_\_\_\_\_did not show any tendency to attribute to **S.L**. any action that \_\_\_\_\_\_only conjectured about by having heard from other people, instead of having witnessed it \_\_\_\_\_\_. clearly differentiated facts related about **S.L**. by other persons from \_\_\_\_\_\_own observations. This gave \_\_\_\_\_\_ statement a value of objectivity.
- 137. Witness D's statement seemed to the panel to be spontaneous and at the same time consistent. \_\_\_\_\_\_ testified in a confident and consequent manner. All facts mentioned in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ narration matched each other and made a coherent and convincing account of the events.
- 138. Witness D's credibility was verified through meticulous and detailed cross examination performed not only by the defense counsel but also by the panel members. \_\_\_\_\_ was asked numerous repetitive questions and was not even slightly confused by them. All \_\_\_\_\_ answers were coherent and consequent. Veracity of recount was a subject of

testing during four hearing sessions. On no occasion did \_\_\_\_\_\_deflect from the version presented through \_\_\_\_\_\_whole testimony.

- 139. Witness D showed no tendency to deliberately evade any topic. \_\_\_\_\_\_ seemed to be fully responsive as much as \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ memory allowed it. At the same time \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not hesitate to admit that \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not remember some facts of minor significance, grounding even more \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ objectivity. Furthermore, this appeared to be quite understandable because of the time passed.<sup>65</sup>
- 140. There were some noticeable disparities between Witness D's pre-trial depositions and \_\_\_\_\_\_ in-court statement challenged by defense counsel Gregor Guy Smith and Arianit Koci, in relation to the killing attributed to S.L. :
  - 140.1. in the pre-trial stage the witness testified that in the very moment when the first shot was fired the victim was in a standing position<sup>66</sup>, while in the courtroom the witness clearly stated the victim was kneeling at the time;<sup>67</sup>
  - 140.2. in the pre-trial stage the witness said that \_\_\_\_\_\_ came to S.L. 's house in \_\_\_\_\_\_ in the night and then S.L. told \_\_\_\_\_ to go with \_\_\_\_\_\_ and they went by a vehicle to the crime scene. In the court \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ stayed in S. L. 's \_\_\_\_\_'s house in \_\_\_\_\_\_ overnight an went to the crime scene only the next day.<sup>68</sup>

65 Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 20, 22, 31, 32, 42, and 12 November p. 9.

<sup>66</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 13 November 2014 p. 46.

<sup>67</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 12 November 2014 p. 4.

<sup>68</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 40.

- 141. Both challenges were presented in the course of cross examination and did not baffle the witness. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stayed by \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ version presented during examination in chief. In the opinion of the trial panel divergences and disparities resulted from the time lapse and natural imperfection of human perception and memory. In fact they assured the trial panel that the testimony given in front of the panel was fully spontaneous and had not been concocted beforehand by the witness.
- 142. \_\_\_\_\_ reaction to the confrontation with the disparities seemed to be natural and spontaneous. \_\_\_\_\_\_ explanation with regard to specificity of details asked during the examination in the main trial<sup>69</sup> was assessed by the panel as a sincere and convincing. In fact the interrogation during investigation was not very specific. The record shows that no questions for clarification were asked at that time. Therefore, the discrepancies did not impeach Witness D's credibility.
- 143. There was no credible piece of evidence contradicting Witness D's statement. In particular, testimonies of witness N.F. and witness K.H. were not convincing and therefore not reliable. The story presented by witness J.L. did not deny Witness D's truthfulness as it only denied the veracity of the explanation that S.L. presented to Witness D at the critical time.
- 144. In his closing arguments, the defense counsel Arianit Koci presented some other arguments in order to impeach Witness D's credibility, namely that:

144.1. the	Witness	erroneously	stated	that	S.L.
was "		of	the		of
″	whereas	became	0	f the	
		only sometime	in		The

<sup>69</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 13 November 2014 p. 27.

panel concluded that this error does not prove that the witness lied deliberately. It only showed that had a limited knowledge of the \_\_\_\_\_ structure which does not affect veracity of \_\_\_\_\_ recollection of facts that witnessed;

- 144.2. it was impossible to drive for \_\_\_\_\_km without encountering any \_\_\_\_\_\_ check point. The panel found that this thesis was not supported by any evidence;
- 144.3. it was impossible to communicate with \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ in a distance of \_\_\_ km by radio and the phones were not working. Witness D actually did no say that S. L. communicated in \_\_\_ presence with \_\_\_ who escorted the victim. Logical reasoning led the panel to the presumption that the \_\_\_ observed the road so they were able to appear immediately after they saw S.L. smoking a cigarette upon arrival.

Witness A.G.

- 145. Witness A.G. presented \_\_\_\_\_ testimony in a logical and coherent way. It fully corresponded with the statements of F.B. and H.H. in relation to the medical treatment that **S.G.** was given in \_\_\_\_\_. For these reasons the panel assessed \_\_\_\_\_\_ testimony as reliable.
- 146. The Witness indicated that after the surgery that took
   place in the end of \_\_\_\_ or beginning of \_\_\_\_\_, S.
   G. had the injured \_\_\_\_ immobilized with plaster cast.
   However, \_\_\_ could move if only the other \_\_\_\_ was operant.
   The witness admitted that \_\_\_\_ had no knowledge if the
   injuries of the non-immobilized prevented S.G.

from moving on \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>70</sup> \_\_\_\_ admitted that **S.G.** could move on \_\_\_\_\_\_ on a distance of few meters.<sup>71</sup> This statement complies with testimonies of Witness A and Witness D.

Witness A's application for \_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_

\_ \_\_\_

Medical certificate issued for Witness A by G. H. on \_\_\_\_\_

- 148. The panel assessed the medical certificate issued by G.H. on \_\_\_\_\_ as authentic. Its origin was confirmed by the doctor.
- 149. The certificate itself was accepted only as a proof that the doctor issued the diagnosis written in the certificate and not as a proof of the correctness of the diagnosis.

<sup>70</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 13 February 2015 p. 14.

<sup>71</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 13 February 2015 p. 14.

### b. Evidence partially reliable

#### Witness B

- 150. The panel came to the conclusion that only the part of Witness B's statement presented by \_\_\_\_\_ on direct examination and that was related to the beating of the Witness \_\_\_\_\_\_ performed by **S.G.** could be used for reconstruction of facts. \_\_\_\_\_ narration on the beating was consequent and firm.
- 151. Witness B talked about the grievance that \_\_\_\_\_ suffered from S.G. \_\_\_\_\_ in a sincere and adamant way. \_\_\_\_\_ determination to present the disservice that \_\_\_\_\_ suffered was apparent, despite security concerns that the witness pointed at.
- 152. During the cross examination, Witness B denied that \_\_\_\_\_ was ever beaten by **S.G.** . While confronted with \_\_\_\_\_ different version given in examination in chief, \_\_\_\_ did not explain the reasons of disparity and reacted in a visibly anxious manner, obviously hiding the true reason of changing \_\_\_\_ testimony. Therefore \_\_\_\_\_ denial was not convincing.
- 153. Witness B's version in relation to the circumstances of \_\_\_\_\_\_arrest was contradicted by Witness A. According to Witness B, Witness A cooperated with \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ on that occasion and was even armed with a handgun. Witness B obviously evaded answering questions directed to Witness A's participation in \_\_\_\_\_arrest.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 14 October 2014 p. 9.

- 154. Despite assertion that Witness A cooperated with the \_\_\_\_\_\_ and was even allowed to carry a gun, Witness B spontaneously said that \_\_\_\_ did not even see where "they" had taken Witness A.<sup>73</sup> These words indicated that Witness B actually assumed that Witness A had been "taken", i.e. deprived of liberty while stayed in / .
- 155. In the light of facts presented by Witness A and Witness K, the ascertainments on Witness A cooperating with \_\_\_\_\_\_ during the arrest were completely unrealistic.
- 156.Witness B determined that \_\_\_\_ was brought to \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ and then beaten by **S**. **G**. on \_\_\_\_\_\_. The indication of the first date is visibly erroneous as Witness A convincingly stated that they were brought to \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.
- 157. Witness B's statements on the duration of \_\_\_\_\_ stay in \_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ denial of being involved in the incident when \_\_\_\_\_ was maltreated together with Witness A are contrary to Witness A's testimony.
- 158. Witness B's allegation on falsification of \_\_\_\_ pre-trial statement by the prosecutor sounded naïve and unconvincing. On cross examination \_\_\_ denied even the facts that \_\_\_ already admitted in front of the court.
- 159. Witness B's behavior during the main trial indicated that \_\_\_\_\_ was afraid to tell the truth. \_\_\_\_\_ was agitated, evasive and \_\_\_\_\_\_ reactions to some questions manifested this. \_\_\_\_\_ did not explain the reason of the substantial change of version of events.

<sup>73</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 14 October 2014 p. 14.

160. Witness B had concerns about \_\_\_\_\_ personal security. This finding was made on the basis of the testimony given by the witness C.S.

Witness H.H.

- 161. The testimony of H.H. was logical and corresponded with the statement of F.B. and A. G. . The Witness showed willingness to give exhausting answers.
- 162. However, the panel did not accept the witness's circumscription of time until S.G. stayed immobilized after the surgery. The Witness stated that S.G. stayed in the recumbent position until the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_\_.<sup>74</sup> The witness showed some degree of uncertainty in placing the events in time.<sup>75</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ explained that \_\_\_\_\_\_ set out the time according to \_\_\_\_\_\_ recollection of weather condition or the savor in the air. \_\_\_\_\_\_ explained that \_\_\_\_\_\_ used the same method to determine the time when S.G. was operated and \_\_\_\_\_\_ gave different indications of the time on direct and cross examinations.<sup>76</sup>
- 163. The testimony of witness H.H. as to the
  period of S.G. 's immobilization was contradicted by
  Witness A and Witness D. They saw S.G. moving on
  \_\_\_\_\_ or in a \_\_\_\_\_. Also Witness B convincingly
  testified that S.G. maltreated \_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_,
  after \_\_\_ was brought to \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ with Witness
  A who testified that it was on \_\_\_\_\_\_.

<sup>74</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 10 March 2015 p. 6.

<sup>75</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 10 March 2015 p. 23.

<sup>76</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 10 March 2015 p. 24.

#### c. Presumptions and notorious facts adopted by the panel

- 164. The panel accepted the presumption that Witness B, the brothers from \_\_\_\_\_\_ and the man from \_\_\_\_\_\_ neither served in the \_\_\_\_\_ nor participated in hostilities. It was based on assessment that no piece of evidence indicated their involvement in combat or other form of hostilities related to the armed conflict. It is a notorious fact that the majority of Kosovo Albanians were exposed to atrocities caused by the conflict. Not all of them actively participated in hostilities although many of them might have supported the \_\_\_\_\_\_ in various other forms.
- 165. It was concluded by the panel that the shots fired by **S.L.** into the unidentified \_\_\_\_'s head deprived the man of his life. This presumption was based on the general knowledge that shots fired in the victim's skull with a muzzle pointing at the place behind an ear would probably result in death of the victim. The degree of probability is in this case so close to certainty that no reasonable doubts as to the demise of the victim are actually left.
- 166. S.L. did not tell Witness D the truth about the reason for killing the unknown \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_ presence. This presumption was a consequence of positive assessment of the testimony of witness J.L. .
- 167. The weapons that witnesses commonly referred to as "TT pistol" or as "AK-47" were presumed by the panel to be in fact a type of TT pistol or a type of AK-47 assault rifle. It is a notorious fact that instead of original weaponry, fully functional replicas made by various manufacturers were commonly used in armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia. None of the witnesses who mentioned some weapons had the opportunity to examine it nor did they seem to have a specialist knowledge on weaponry.

168. It was accepted as a notorious fact that at the time when Witness A was kept in \_\_\_\_\_\_ and when S. L. killed an unknown \_\_\_\_\_ between \_\_\_\_\_\_ and there was an armed conflict going on in Kosovo. There were numerous casualties, damage of property, and displacement of civilians. This notoriety was reinforced by the facts presented by Witness A<sup>77</sup>, Witness D<sup>78</sup>, and also by F. B. , A.G. and B. G. .

#### d. Evidence reliable but not conclusive

Witness J.L.

169. The panel assessed the testimony given by witness J. L. as credible. There were no elements that would dictate criticism of \_\_\_\_\_ veracity. Having in mind common respect for forefathers and, generally, respect for family values that is ever present in Kosovo, it seems unlikely that \_\_\_\_ would deliberately provide an alibi for a person who presumably murdered \_\_\_\_\_\_ by lying about circumstances of \_\_\_\_\_'s death.

Witness F.B.

170. There were no reasons to deny the credibility of witness
F.B. \_\_\_\_\_ recollection of facts was adequate to
the time lapse. \_\_\_\_\_ answered questions in a sincere manner
and \_\_\_\_\_ testimony was corroborated by H.H. \_\_\_\_\_.
However, \_\_\_\_ had no direct knowledge about S.G. \_\_\_\_\_ 's
ability to \_\_\_\_\_\_ in the end of \_\_\_\_\_\_ nor about the
\_\_\_\_\_'s \_\_\_\_\_\_.

<sup>77</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 24 June 2014 p. 14.

<sup>78</sup> Minutes of the main trial; 11 November 2014 p. 13.

- 171. Witness B.G. presented \_\_\_\_ recollection in a sincere and logical way. There were no grounds to doubt \_\_\_\_\_ credibility. At the same time it turned out that \_\_\_\_\_ statement contained almost no elements that could be used for reconstruction of facts related to the charges. The only exception referred to the treatment provided to **S.G.** .
- 172. The Witness did not know any facts directly related to
  S.G. 's medical condition in the \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_
  \_\_\_ nor did he know the \_\_\_\_'s commanding structure at the
  critical time except mentioning S.L. and
  S.S. as the \_\_\_\_\_.

Witness C.S.

- 173. There were no reasons to criticize the veracity of witness C.S. . <u>testimony</u> consists of no elements that would be unrealistic.
- 174. Witness C.S. repeated information that \_\_\_\_\_ received from Witness B about \_\_\_\_\_ concerns for \_\_\_\_\_ personal security. This information corresponded with Witness B's behavior during the testimony: \_\_\_\_ was visibly agitated, frightened and felt unsecure.
- 175. The facts presented by C.S. were useless for the reconstruction of facts. There was no way to verify if Witness B told the truth.

176. The testimony of witness C.S. indicated that Witness B was frightened. However, Witness B's reliability was already denied on numerous other grounds.

#### Witness N

- 177. Witness N, the \_\_\_\_\_ of Witness F, testified in a sincere way. There were no grounds to reject \_\_\_\_\_ credibility. However, \_\_\_\_\_ statement consisted mostly of hearsay that was told to \_\_\_\_\_ by \_\_\_\_\_ Witness F. There was no basis for verification of this hearsay and for this reason Witness N's testimony could not contribute to the reconstruction of facts.
- 178. Witness N confirmed that \_\_\_\_\_ was absent for some time and that \_\_ told \_\_\_ that \_\_ was taken by the \_\_\_\_ and that \_\_ came home wounded. The remaining pieces of credible evidence were not sufficient to link these facts to any criminal actions of any of the defendants.

#### Witness O

179. There were no grounds to disqualify the truthfulness of Witness O. \_\_\_\_\_\_ testimony was also entirely based on unverifiable hearsay coming from \_\_\_\_\_\_, Witness F. Therefore, it was not useful for fact finding.

### Witness G.H.

180. As elaborated above, the panel believed that on \_\_\_\_\_\_ G.H. issued a certificate that confirmed that Witness A suffered from acute psychosis and was unable to work. The Witness firmly confirmed the origin of the document. 181.G.H. did not recollect the examination of Witness A. \_\_\_\_\_ indicated that Witness A and some members of family were patients before the war.

- 182.G.H. 's testimony was coherent and logical. In the light of \_\_\_\_ understanding of acute psychosis, \_\_\_\_ diagnosis appears as quite probable. This conclusion was based by the panel on the common sense analysis of \_\_\_\_ testimony. \_\_\_ indicated that traumatic events may induce acute psychosis. The panel noticed that the events that \_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_.
- 183. The witness explained that according to \_\_\_\_\_ acute psychosis meant what follows:

"Acute psychosis is brief psychotic state which is displayed as a consequence of serious traumatic situations or events, in case of loss of a dear family member, in stressful situations which is manifested with psychiatric disorders which attack many spheres, mainly the area of thinking, the perception aspect, the individual is out of the reality, on whom the delusional ideas would predominate, we would have also cognitive disorders, perception disorders, where present are hallucinations, both auditory or visual and as I mentioned earlier personality disorder with the consequence of losing himself and sense of reality around him."

- 184. \_\_\_\_\_ also explained that acute psychosis usually happened for a brief period of time. \_\_\_\_\_\_ pointed out at the possibility of repetition.(1 March 2015).
- 185. The panel found no reason to confront G.H. 's understanding of acute psychosis with the commonly applied definition of this kind of mental disorder.

186. The diagnosis itself did not impair the assessment of Witness A's competency to give reliable testimony as it was adopted by the panel. According to the panel's observations during the trial, Witness A showed no single symptom described by G.H. as typical for acute psychosis. There was no indication that perception or recollection of ability to present facts was in any way affected by a mental disorder.

#### II. Evidence rejected as a basis for reconstruction of facts

Witness F.M.

- 187. The panel critically assessed the testimony presented by witness F.M. . As it was presented on cross examination, this witness deflected completely from \_\_\_\_\_ pre-trial statement. In the opinion of the panel this discrepancy is so profound that it cannot be attributed simply to the imperfection of the witness's reporting skill. In the pre-trial stage the witness presented the ability to be quite precise and logical. However, after full consideration, the Panel finds that this discrepancy has been purposefully fabricated because \_\_\_\_\_ version of events obviously contradicts the testimony of Witness A and \_\_\_\_\_ own statement given in the pre-trial stage.
- 188. The witness was examined by the prosecutor as a hostile witness. \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not give any convincing reasons for changing \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ version of events. \_\_\_\_\_\_ allegations that \_\_\_\_\_\_ pre-trial interrogation was falsified appeared to be naive and unrealistic, as any falsification would be more than obvious to be revealed to the court. In principle, the criminal procedure does not allow for the use of the record of a pre-trial interview as direct evidence, which makes a falsification consisting of completely fictitious facts useless. The allegations appeared to the panel as frivolous and hollow accusations.

- 189. The panel assessed the testimony of Witness L, the \_\_\_\_\_\_ of Witness A, as not credible. There were significant disparities between Witness L's and Witness A's testimonies. According to Witness L \_\_\_\_\_ was taken to \_\_\_\_/ on \_\_\_\_\_ by \_\_\_\_\_ and one of them was J.D. . Witness A indicated the date of \_\_\_\_\_\_ arrest. Witness K did not mention J.D. during \_\_\_\_\_\_ arrest. Witness L denied that \_\_\_\_ had contact with S.S. \_\_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_\_ while \_\_\_\_\_\_ stayed there.
- 190. Witness L confirmed that Witness A told \_\_\_\_\_ that \_\_\_\_ and Witness B were maltreated together and forced to beat each other. Witness L described also that \_\_\_\_\_\_ looked as if \_\_\_\_ had been maltreated, after \_\_\_\_\_ return home. At the same time, Witness L came to trial with an apparent intent to discredit Witness A. \_\_\_\_ pointed out \_\_\_\_\_\_'s alleged mental infirmity saying that \_\_\_\_ was retarded, and \_\_\_\_ even brought a medical certificate that \_\_\_\_\_\_ indicated as proof of it (exhibit \_). \_\_\_\_\_ behavior went far beyond a sole correction of alleged mistakes that \_\_\_\_\_ made in relation to the identification of S.S. \_\_\_\_\_.

191. Witness L's account of \_\_\_\_\_ erroneous recognition of S.S. was unrealistic. \_\_\_\_\_allegedly saw S.S. on TV and recognized \_\_\_\_\_as a \_\_\_\_that \_\_\_\_ met in \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_. Then, after being interrogated by the prosecutor, Witness L again saw S.S. on TV and realized that \_\_\_\_\_made a mistake. During examination in front of the panel \_\_\_\_\_presented strong arguments to explain \_\_\_\_\_alleged mistake. \_\_\_\_\_recalled height and face features of the \_\_\_\_\_that \_\_\_\_ confused with S. S..\_\_\_\_\_that \_\_\_\_\_performed such recollection only before coming to the trial.

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- 192. Witness L was visibly hostile towards **J.D.** . \_\_\_\_\_\_ accused \_\_\_\_\_ of being a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and tended to attribute some actions to \_\_\_\_\_ which were not confirmed by any credible piece of evidence.
- 193. The witness tended to avoid giving straight answers. The panel's impression was that \_\_\_\_\_ hedged to refer to issues that was asked about.

#### Witness C

- 194. Witness C's testimony given in the main trial was completely unreliable. From the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_ appearance in the courtroom \_\_\_\_ showed a hostile attitude towards the justice system. \_\_\_\_\_ was arrogant and disrespectful. It was obvious that \_\_\_\_ tended to sabotage confronting \_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_ pre-trial depositions.
- 195. \_\_\_\_\_\_ totally contradicted \_\_\_\_\_ allegations presented to the prosecutor in the pre-trial stage. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ story on falsification of the records of \_\_\_\_\_\_ pre-trial interview was naive and unconvincing.

#### Witness F

197. The panel critically assessed the probative value of Witness F's testimony. Although \_\_\_\_ presented a coherent version of events during the main trial, it contradicted \_\_\_\_\_ pre-trial statement so significantly that disparity could not be attributed only to various recollections of facts. 198. The panel concluded that Witness F intentionally changed \_\_\_\_\_\_\_story and concocted the account of events presented in the courtroom in order to exculpate defendants that \_\_\_\_\_\_ previously incriminated. \_\_\_\_\_\_explanation on divergences between \_\_\_\_\_\_statements pointed out at alleged falsification of record. The allegations were unfounded and contradicted common sense.

#### Witness I

- 199. Witness I was examined by the prosecutor as a hostile witness. From the very beginning of \_\_\_\_\_\_ statement \_\_\_\_\_ was agitated and presented an hostile attitude towards the proceedings. \_\_\_\_\_\_ obstructed the interrogation by falling into narration not related to the questions. \_\_\_\_\_\_ behavior indicated a lack of sincerity and for this reason \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ testimony was not credible.
- 200. Witness I completely denied \_\_\_\_\_ allegations presented in the pre-trial proceedings. \_\_\_\_\_ accused the prosecutor, who interrogated \_\_\_\_\_\_ during the investigation phase, of falsification of the record, but \_\_\_\_\_ did not explain why the record was signed by \_\_\_\_\_\_ as congruous with \_\_\_\_\_\_ statement. \_\_\_\_\_ reaction to the pre-trial statement being read in the courtroom was marked by extreme emotions.

## Witness K.H.

- 201. The testimony of witness K.H. was assessed by the panel as not credible. The witness contradicted Witness D's statements as to their contacts in \_\_\_\_\_ by denying acquaintance with \_\_\_.
- 202. The reason of the negative assessment was the witness's behavior during cross-examination. \_\_\_\_ was obviously

evasive. On direct examination \_\_\_\_\_ showed an ability to express precisely and straight to the point.

203. During cross-examination, \_\_\_\_\_ deliberately avoided answers related to \_\_\_\_\_\_ contacts with some of the defendants. Therefore, the panel evaluated \_\_\_\_\_\_ testimony as not candid and for this reason not truthful.

Witness N.F.

204. The panel was not convinced by the testimony given by witness N.F. . According to Witness D, N. F. brought \_\_\_\_ once to \_\_\_\_/ \_\_\_\_ by \_\_\_ car.

205. Witness N.F. gave evasive and contradicting answers to the questions related to the possession of a car during the war. Initially, \_\_\_\_\_ said that in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ had no car at all because it was burnt by \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ at the beginning of the war. After another question \_\_\_\_\_\_ said that the war started with \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ and that it took place in the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ As an answer to the next question \_\_\_\_\_\_ said that it happened in the \_\_\_\_\_. It was visible that at the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_\_ testimony the witness tried to avoid the fact that \_\_\_\_\_\_ was in possession of a vehicle in the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

206.Witness N.F. admitted that \_\_\_\_\_ knew Witness D, but \_\_\_\_\_\_ denied that \_\_\_\_\_ ever went with \_\_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_\_. This denial was not reliable because of the witness's insincerity in relation to the possession of a car.

# D. The charges that have not been substantiated by evidence

- 207. The panel found no evidence supporting the following charges:
  - \_ beating of Witness C by **S.G.** and **S**. (counts 9(2), and 11(2)of the indictment); J. by **S.J.**  beating of I.B. (count 11(3) of the indictment); killing of I.B. by **S.G.** \_ and **S**. (counts 9(1), and 11(4) of the indictment); J. beating of Witness I by **S.S.** and **S**. **J.** (counts 11(8), and 13 (7) of the indictment); \_ wounding of Witness F by I.H. (count 10(1) of the indictment); - beating of Witness F by **S.J.** , S. L. , and A.Z. (counts 11(5), 12(2), and 15(2) of the indictment); - beating of Witness F by A.Z. (count 15(3) of the indictment) beating of an unknown \_\_\_\_\_ from and Witness F by **A.Z.** (count 15(4) of the indictment); - beating of Witness E by **S.J.** (count 11(6) of the indictment);
  - beating of \_\_\_\_\_unidentified civilians, a \_\_\_\_\_ and a \_\_\_\_\_ by **S.J.** (count 11(7) of the indictment).
- 208. The sole pieces of evidence that supported these charges were pretrial interviews of witnesses who did not stand by their inculpatory statements during the main trial (Witness B, Witness C, Witness F, Witness I, Witness L) or did not appear for the trial (Witness E, Witness G). According to Article 123 Paragraph 1 of the CPCRK pre-trial interviews may be used as a basis to substantiate pre-trial investigative orders, orders for detention on remand, and indictments, but must not be used as direct evidence for determination of guilt when the case enters a stage of main trial.

- 209. The content of threats towards Witness A directed by **S.J.** and **S.S.** and containing reference to the death of I.B. was not sufficient to determine the culprit and to recreate the circumstances of this death.
- 210. The panel found no evidence supporting the charge
  consisting in criminal responsibility, as "person
  exercising control", of S.J. , S.L. ,
  A.Z. and S.S. for the operation and
  conditions in the \_\_\_\_/ detention center (counts
  11(1), 12(1), 13(1), and 15(1) of the indictment).
- 211. It was established that there were two rooms in the \_\_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_ that were used by the \_\_\_\_\_ as holding cells to incarcerate civilians.
- 212. There were chains in the Witness A's cell, but there was no evidence that any of the prisoners were shackled.
- 213. There was no evidence that before Witness A's stay in \_\_\_\_\_\_ there were any prisoners incarcerated there. The testimony of Witness D does allow for the conclusion that persons that \_\_\_\_\_ saw in the holding cells were actually kept there for any extended period of time.
- 214. There was no evidence that any person apart from Witness A was a subject of maltreatment consisting in inadequate nutrition, or exposed to inadequate sanitary conditions and excessive heat due to the lack of ventilation. This maltreatment appeared as an action of the unidentified sentries and there was no evidence that it was ordered or even acknowledged by any of the defendants.

- 216. There was no evidence that the accused who did not participate in a particular beating were aware that this beating took place. Therefore, they could only be held responsible for the beating that they committed.
- E. Legal classification of the actions attributed to the accused

## I. Subjective identity of the judgement over indictment

218. Following Article 360 Paragraphs 2 of the CPCRK, the panel was not bound by the legal classification of charges that was presented in the indictment. However, due to the requirement of subjective identity of the judgement over the indictment which is stipulated in Article 360 Paragraphs 2 of the CPCRK, the crimes that were assigned to the accused could not consist of material elements that were not contained in the counts in the indictment. Therefore, the panel did not relegate any particular injuries sustained by the victims to the deeds committed by the accused while determining the acts that were attributed to the accused and matching the facts in the case with definitions of crimes.

#### II. International humanitarian law

- 219. It was established that the actions attributed to the accused happened during the period when armed clashes in Kosovo took place between the regular army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which controlled Kosovo before the war and fighters belonging to the Kosovo Liberation Army.
- 220. The actions consisted mostly of abuse that included violence against individual civilian persons, and applied with various degree of intensity. In one case it resulted in death.
- 221. For centuries the savagery of warfare has been the subject of the efforts made by the international community to limit the effects of military operations by protecting persons who were not participating in hostilities. The efforts contributed to the development of a branch of international law called: international humanitarian law. Serious violations of this law became penalized as war crimes.

#### a. Definition of prohibited acts

222. The first regulation of International humanitarian law that dealt specifically with humanitarian protection in situations of non-international armed conflict was Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions adopted on 12 August 1949:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

"1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."

223. The catalogue of acts that should be prohibited was complemented by Article 4 Paragraph 2 of the Additional Protocol II which partially repeated the wording of common Article 3. It recommended penalization of the following acts:

> "(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;

- (b) collective punishments;
- (c) taking of hostages;
- (d) acts of terrorism;

(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;

(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;

(g) pillage;

(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts."

224. The Geneva Conventions of August 1949, with their common Article 3, were ratified by the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on 15 September 1950.79 On 26 December 1978 the Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva conventions was ratified by the Republic under its new name, i.e. as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>80</sup>

#### b. Existence of non-international armed conflict

225. The trial panel decided to follow the functional definition of non- international armed conflict provided by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic<sup>81</sup> case. This definition has been commonly applied by the ICTY as a formula for the characterization of non-international armed conflict<sup>82</sup>:

<sup>79</sup> Službeni vjesnik Predizijuma Narodne skupštine FNRJ broj 6/1950. od 15. rujna 1950 (The official gazette of the Presidium of the National Assembly of FPRY, no. 6/1950, dated 15 September 1950).

<sup>80</sup> Međunarodni ugovori at 1083 (International contracts at 1083).

<sup>81</sup> Prosecutor v. Tadic, case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995.

 $<sup>82\ \</sup>mbox{Prosecutor}\ v.$  Delalic , Mucic , Delic and Landzo , Trial Chamber Judgment, 16 November 1998, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, para. 183; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 December 1998, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1, para. 59; Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Chamber Judgment, 26 February 2001, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, para. 24; Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez , Appeals Chamber Judgment, 17 December 2004, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, para. 336; Prosecutor v. Kunarac , Kovac and Vukovic, Trial Chamber Judgment, 22 February 2001, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23, para. 402; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic , Appeals Chamber Judgment, 12 June 2002, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23, para. 56; Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Trial Chamber Judgment, 31 March 2003, ICTY Case No. IT-98-34-T, para. 177; Prosecutor v. Staki, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 31 July 2003, para. 568; Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševic, Third Chamber Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal ( Miloševic Rule 98bis Decision), ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-T, 16 June 2004, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2005, para. 536; Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 31 January 2005, para. 215; Prosecutor v. Limaj , Bala , and Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 30 November 2005, para. 84; Prosecutor v. Ori , Judgment, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Chamber II, 30 June 2006, para. 254.

"An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State".

- 226. It should be stressed out that the provisions of common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions should apply also outside the actual theatre of combat operations which means in the whole territory under the control of a party whether or not actual combat takes place.
- 227. The practice of the ICTY established two fundamental criteria of protracted armed conflict: the organization of the parties and the intensity of the violence.
- 228. With regard to government forces, it is commonly presumed that they meet that requirement without it being necessary to carry out an evaluation in each case. As for non-governmental armed groups, the indicative elements that need to be taken into account include, for example: the existence of a command structure, the authority to launch operations bringing together different units, the ability to recruit and train new combatants or the existence of internal rules.
- 229. The trial panel took judicial notice of the findings of the ICTY in the *Prosecutor v. Limaj* case:

"before the end of May 1998 the KLA already sufficiently possessed the characteristics of an organized armed group, able to engage in an internal armed conflict";<sup>83</sup>

"KLA attacks were carried out against a variety of Serbian military, community and commercial targets over a widespread and expanding area of Kosovo";<sup>84</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Prosecutor v. Limaj , Bala , and Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment,

<sup>30</sup> November 2005, para 134.

<sup>84</sup> Ibidem, para 169.

"many combat operations were carried out in the area of Drenica where the KLA developed earlier and was probably best organized."  $^{\rm N^{85}}$ 

- 230. In assessing the intensity of armed violence during a period of actions established trough the reconstruction of facts, the trial panel used a similar approach to that applied by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Milosevic case (Prosecutor v Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Rule 98 bis Decision, 16 June 2004, paras 26-32): the engagement of governmental troops, the use of artillery, the destruction of property, the displacement of local population, which were proven in the main trial and also the existence of casualties which is known as a notorious fact.
- 231. Therefore, the trial panel assessed that there was a non- international armed conflict going on in the meaning of common Article 3 in the period relevant for the actions attributed to the accused in this case. It triggered a further analysis of the applicability of this provision.

#### c. Nexus

232. The panel followed the concept observed by the ICTY in relation to the necessity of a nexus between the accused's action and the armed conflict, in order to classify a criminal act committed during the armed conflict as a war crime.

233. In the Tadic case, the ICTY expressed the opinion that:

"There must be an obvious link between the criminal act and the armed conflict . . . It is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict." (Prosecutor v Tadic, Case

<sup>85</sup> Ibidem, para 170.

No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70.)

- 234. In the same case, the ICTY stressed the fact that a war crime can be perpetrated even if "substantial clashes were not occurring in the region at the time and place" where the crimes were allegedly committed. (ibidem)
- 235. A more detailed explanation on this issue was presented by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac case:

"What ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a war crime is shaped by or dependent upon the environment - the armed conflict - in which it is committed. It need not have been planned or supported by some form of plan or policy. The armed conflict need not have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator's ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed. Hence, if it can be established, as in the present case, that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were closely related to the armed conflict [. . . ] "<sup>86</sup>;

- 236. The trial panel assessed that the actions that took place in \_\_\_\_/ were explicitly linked to the armed conflict going on:
  - 236.1. all the perpetrators were members of an armed group that was well structured and that effectively controlled at least a part

<sup>86</sup> Judgment, Prosecutor V. D. Kunarac, R. Kovac e Z. Vukovic, Appeal Chamber, 12 June 2002, par 58 and 59.

of the territory of Kosovo. The control disabled any activity of governmental agendas including state-run law enforcement which instead took a position of an enemy and persecutor of \_\_\_\_\_ population. Therefore, civilians were deprived of any form of legal protection against arbitrary and offensive acts committed by \_\_\_'s \_\_\_\_\_. The culprits enjoyed a temporary impunity;

- 236.2. extended deprivation of liberty of Witness A and other persons incarcerated in \_\_\_\_\_\_ was possible because of the lack of legal protection that should be provided by the state in peace time. Such a protection would normally provide for a system of competent organs and procedures to review complaints against unlawfulness and conditions of detention;
- 236.3. the detention lasted long enough to elicit such complaints in a time of peace;
- 236.4. the apprehension of Witness A took place in the presence of the members of his family. They were deprived of an opportunity to react effectively because of a nonfunctioning State apparatus;
- 236.5. additionally, the abuse that Witness A suffered from was motivated by \_\_\_\_ presumed collaboration with \_\_\_\_\_\_.

237. The panel rejected the existence of sufficient nexus between the killing attributed to S.L. and the armed conflict going on at that time. Although S. L. was a member of the \_\_\_\_ and the persons who escorted the victim were presumably also in the service of the \_\_\_\_, the link with their military activity is not proven. The sole motivation of the perpetrator remains unknown. The killing itself was a short lasting action. It is not known how the victim was apprehended and if \_\_\_\_\_ was deprived of liberty long enough to cause \_\_\_\_\_\_ actions if this would happen in peace time.

238. As a general rule, war crimes are punished more severely than their common equivalents and they also trigger other negative consequences, as for example the nonapplicability of the statute of limitations. According to Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the CPCRK, doubts regarding the existence of facts relevant for the case shall be interpreted in favor of the accused. Therefore, the panel concluded that there was no sufficient nexus between S. L. 's deed and the armed conflict.

# d. Gravity of violations of the international humanitarian law

- 239. The wording of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II does not set up any threshold of gravity of violations of the provisions that define these acts against civilians that should be prohibited during non-international armed conflicts. The provisions obligate the states to penalize the violations through domestic legislation.
- 240. It was only in 1977, at the occasion of the adoption of the Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Additional Protocol I), that the international community agreed to accept an explicit clause according to which 'grave breaches of the instruments of international humanitarian law shall be regarded as war crimes'.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979, Article 85 (5).

- 241. All pieces of domestic legislation relevant to crimes committed against civilians did not provide for any threshold of seriousness or gravity for the concrete violation of international humanitarian law. The Criminal Code of Kosovo (CCK) [The code entered into force on 6 April 2004 with the name Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (PCCK); according to the Law No. 03/L-002 on supplementation and amendment of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo on 6 November 2008, the code was renamed as Criminal Code of Kosovo (CCK)] in its Article 120 Paragraph 2 and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo (CCRK) in its Article 152 Paragraph 2 stipulated that any breach of the provisions of common Article 3 constitutes a serious violation without reference to particular circumstances of a concrete crime.
- 242. The concept of 'war crimes' commonly accepted by the international community, i.e. crimes committed in the course of an armed conflict that require criminal punishment of the culprit, refers to serious violations of the laws or customs of international or internal armed conflicts.<sup>88</sup>+<sup>89</sup>
- 243. The ICTY jurisprudence established the following interpretation: violation of international humanitarian law is serious if it constitutes a breach of a "rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim".<sup>90</sup>
- 244. The panel fully accepted this interpretation and concluded that:

<sup>88</sup> See article 8 of the ICC Statute, article 2 of the ICTY Statute, article 4 of the ICTR Statute, article 3 of the SCSL Statute and s 6.1 of Regulation 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences (in East Timor), Doc No UNTAET/REG/2000/15 of 6 June 2000.

<sup>89 &</sup>quot;to steal a loaf of bread in an occupied territory does not make a war criminal out of a member of the occupying force": in Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) dated 2 October 1995, Case No IT-94-1-AR/72 [ICTY Appeals Chamber] para 94. 90 Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, June 12, 2002, para. 66.

- 244.1. Beating of Witness B by **S.G.** , beating of a \_\_\_\_\_\_ from \_\_\_\_\_ by **S.S.** and beating of a \_\_\_\_\_ from \_\_\_\_\_\_ by **S.S.** and **S.J.** did not reach the necessary threshold of seriousness. These actions constituted an infringement of important values protected by international humanitarian law: bodily integrity and human dignity. However, it was not proven that any of these actions caused grave consequences for the victims;
- 244.2. Repetitive beating of Witness A amounted to serious violation of international humanitarian law. It violated the same values as other beating did. However, the scale of infringement of Witness A's bodily integrity and dignity met the threshold required for a war crime. The beatings of Witness B and other \_\_\_\_\_ appeared as single, short lasting episodes, while Witness A was exposed to beating for long time. Additionally \_\_\_ was threatened with death and humiliated with accusations of being a \_\_\_\_ testimony proved grave consequences as still suffers from trauma that experienced.

## e. Application of domestic law to the actions meeting criteria of a war crime

- 245. International humanitarian law does not provide for sanctions for the acts that this law prohibits and recommends for such acts to be penalized by domestic legislation. The action committed by **S.S**. , which consisted of elements of prohibited serious violation of international humanitarian law, had to be classified by the application of domestic law. The same applied to the remaining acts attributed to the accused which were not qualified as war crimes.
- 246. The legal classification of the actions that were attributed to each of the accused resulted from comparison of their deeds with elements of particular crimes defined by various pieces of domestic legislation.

247. The trial panel took into consideration the change in the substantial law which took place after the time of commission of the relevant acts and before the time of sentencing. The panel collated the legal provisions provided by the law that was in force at the time of commission of the incriminated action attributed to the accused.

## i. Protection of individual civilians during noninternational armed conflict in domestic law

- 248. The preliminary analysis of the facts in the case that was performed from the perspective of international humanitarian law, led to the conclusion that actions carried out by **S.S**. could be considered as a war crime as they constituted a serious violation of common Article 3 of the four Geneva conventions and Article 4 Paragraph 2 (a) of the Additional Protocol II to the said Conventions.
- 249. These actions consisted of violence in the form of repetitive beating of Witness A with punches and slaps, threatening \_\_\_\_ with death and humiliating \_\_\_\_ by accusing \_\_\_\_ of being a \_\_\_\_\_ .
- 250. International humanitarian law delegates determination of sanctions to domestic law, so the analysis of relevant provisions of the law applicable in Kosovo was necessary.
- 251. The protection of individual civilians during the internal armed conflict in the domestic law that was in force in Kosovo from the time of the war in Kosovo until the time of sentencing in this case underwent a significant evolution.

- 252. Initially Article 142 of the CCSFRY, in its wording as introduced on 1 July 1977, criminalized as war crimes only those acts that were directed against a civilian population. The "socially harmful" acts that were directed against individual civilians were criminalized as ordinary crimes.
- 253. The amendment of Article 142 of the CCSFRY that entered into force on 30 August 1990 widened the scope of criminalization of acts against civilians. Besides numerous crimes against a civilian population, it also criminalized as a war crime an attack against individual civilians or persons unable to fight, which resulted in the death, grave bodily injuries or serious damaging of people's health.<sup>91</sup>
- 254. As a general rule introduced by the Regulation issued by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission on 12 December 1999<sup>92</sup>, which had a retroactive effect from 10 June 1999, the law that entered in force in Kosovo after 22 March 1989 and until 10 of June 1999 was not applicable, under the terms specified in Paragraph 1.2 of the same Regulation.
- 255. War crimes against individual persons were not a subject matter of any former provisions. Therefore, according to Paragraph 1.2 of the said Regulation the court could exceptionally apply relevant provisions that were introduced after 22 March 1989, as long as they were not discriminatory and in compliance with section 1.3 of the same Regulation.
- 256. Nevertheless even the amended Article 142 in its wording introduced on 30 August 1990 did not criminalized the acts committed by S.S. against Witness A, because they did not result in the death, grave bodily injuries or serious damaging of Witness A's health.

<sup>91</sup> Službeni List SFRJ 38/90 (The official gazette of SFRY 38/90).

<sup>92</sup> UNMIK/REG/1999/24 of of 12 December 1999.

257. Criminalization of the said actions was introduced into Kosovo's domestic legal order by Article 120 of the CCK. As referenced above, the code had entered into force on 6 April 2004 under the name of Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (PCCK). Pursuant to the Law No. 03/L-002 on supplementation and amendment of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo on 6 November 2008, the code was renamed as Criminal Code of Kosovo (CCK), without however any changes to the wording of Article 120. Protected persons were defined not only as civilians but as persons not taking parts in hostilities.

258. Article 120 Paragraph 1 of the CCK provided that:

"Whoever commits a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 shall be punished by imprisonment of at least five years to 20 or by long-term imprisonment."

259. Article 120 Paragraph 2 of the CCK stipulated that:

"A serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 means one or more of the following acts committed in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:

1) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

2) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

3) Taking of hostages;"

260. The subsequent piece of legislation that replaced the CCK was the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo

(CCRK). It repeated verbatim the definition of the crime given in Article 120 of the CCK, including the definition of protected persons, but it extended the catalogue of prohibited acts. According to Article 152 of the CKRK:

- "1. Whoever commits a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than five (5) years to 15 or by life-long imprisonment.
- 2. A serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 means one or more of the following acts committed in the context of an armed conflict not of international an character active part against persons taking no in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:

2.1. violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

2.2. committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

2.3. taking of hostages;

2.4. the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable."

261. The panel assessed that the actions that **S.S.** 

performed in relation to Witness A fully correspond with the characteristics of the crime defined in Article 120 Paragraph 2 Subparagraphs 1 and 2 of the CCK, and at the same time in Article 152 Paragraph 2 Subparagraph 2.2 of the CCRK.

#### ii. Concurrence of criminal act

- 262. It was concluded by the panel that **S.S.** acted with the same intent to maltreat Witness A. The notion "the same intent" refers literally to the identity of intention. This conclusion was based on identical modus operandi and the same opportunity used every time by the perpetrator.
- 263. The PCCRK did not define the rules of classification of concurrent criminal acts committed with the same intent. The panel applied the teleological approach and it considered the element of the same intent to be decisive for the classification of all acts performed by S. S , as the execution of \_\_\_\_\_\_ intent to maltreat Witness A as one offence is classified under that code.
- 264. Under the provisions of the CCRK, actions committed by S.S. against Witness A should be classified as one crime in continuation. According to Article 81 of the CCRK:

"1. Criminal offense in continuation is constituted of several same or similar offenses committed in a certain time period by the same perpetrator, and that are considered as a whole due to the existence of at least two (2) of the following conditions:

1.1. the same victim of the criminal offense;

1.2. the same object of the offense;

1.3. the taking advantage of the same situation or the same time relationship;

1.4. the same place or space of commission of the criminal offense; or

1.5. the same intent of the perpetrator."

265. The panel assessed that all of these conditions are met.

266. The panel knows ex officio that in another case S.
S. was convicted of war crimes against Witness A committed in co-perpetration with other persons in \_\_\_\_\_\_ in a similar manner and in the same time as the crime in the present case. In principle, Article 1 Paragraph 6 of the CCRK allows for separate adjudication of the criminal offence that was not included in the criminal offense in continuation.

## iii. Principle of legality

- 267. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo that entered into force on 15 June 2008 adopted the principle of legality which is considered by civilized nations as a fundamental rule of criminal justice. It stipulates that no one should be punished for any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the law in force at the time when it was committed.
- 268. Simultaneously, the Constitution recognizes a substantial exception to this principle. The exception allows for the punishing of perpetrators of acts that at the time they were committed constituted genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity according to international law. The principle of legality and the exception to the principle of non- retroactivity of substantive criminal law are expressed in Article 33 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution:

"No one shall be charged or punished for any act which did not constitute a penal offense under law at the time it was committed, except acts that at the time they were committed constituted genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity according to international law."

269. This exception to the principle of legality stays in conformity with Article 7 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms<sup>93</sup>:

"1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.

2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."

270. Pursuant to this exception to the principle of nonretroactivity of substantive criminal law provided for in Article 33 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, both the CCK and the CCRK might be considered for legal classification of **S.S.** 's acts.

#### iv. Application of most favorable law

271. There has been a firmly established principle of mandatory application of the most favorable substantive law applicable in Kosovo in the period from the commission of the acts to the sentencing.

<sup>93</sup> According to Article 22 Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo the provisions of European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo and, in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions.

#### 272. According to Article 4 of the CCSFRY:

(1) The law that was in power at the time when a criminal act was committed shall be applied to the person who has committed the criminal act.

(2) If the law has been altered one or more times after the criminal act was committed, the law which is less severe in relation to the offender shall be applied.

- 273. The same principle was repeated in subsequent legislation, i.e. in Article 2 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CCK and in Article 3 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CCRK.
- 274. The law does not stipulate any criteria for indication of the most favorable law. The panel followed the interpretation that dictates consideration of the concrete situation of the accused. It made necessary a simulation of sentencing in accordance with both relevant pieces of legislation.
- 275. The sanction prescribed by Article 120 Paragraph 1 of the CCK was imprisonment of at least five to twenty years or long time imprisonment.
- 276. According to Article 37 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CCK the punishment of long-term imprisonment could be imposed for the most serious criminal offences committed intentionally either under particularly aggravating circumstances or causing especially grave consequences. This punishment could last for a term of twenty-one to forty years.
- 277. According to Article 44 Paragraph 1 of the CCRK the punishment of life long imprisonment could be imposed for the most serious criminal offenses committed under especially aggravating circumstances or criminal offenses that have caused severe consequences.

- 278. The panel concluded that the circumstances of the case did not justify imposing against **S.S.** neither long-term imprisonment nor life imprisonment as the crime that \_\_\_\_\_ committed could not be considered as the most serious criminal offense, neither did it cause sufficiently severe consequences.
- 279. Because of these premises, the sanctions that could be considered by the panel were *in concreto*: imprisonment of five to twenty years under the CCK or imprisonment of five to fifteen years under the CCRK. For this reason, the concrete punishment imposed under the CCK would be higher. Therefore, the CCRK appeared as the most favorable piece of legislation as it prescribed a milder sanction.
- 280. The maximum punishment of 15 years of imprisonment stays in conformity with the principle expressed in Article 33 Paragraph 2 of the Constitution:

"No punishment for a criminal act shall exceed the penalty provided by law at the time the criminal act was committed."

281. The panel noted that the phrase "the penalty provided by law" can only refer to the type of punishment and not to the penalty prescribed by law at the time of commission. Following the rule of Article 33 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution some war crimes should be punished even if they were not criminalized at the time of commission and there was no penalty prescribed for them at that time.

- f. Application of domestic law to the acts other than war crimes
  - i. Beatings committed by S.G. , S.S. and S.J.
- 282. The beating of Witness B by S.G. , the beating of an unknown from by S.S. , and the beating of an unidentified man from by S.S. and S.J. were not classified as a war crime because they did not constitute serious violations of common Article 3 to the four Geneva conventions of 1949.
- 283. All these actions consisted of a violation of bodily integrity of various persons, which is commonly referred to as an assault.
- 284. The principle of subjective identity of the judgement in relation to the indictment excluded attribution of any results to these assaults, in particular any injuries that victims might have sustained.
- 285. The analysis of the law in force at the time they were committed led to the conclusion that assault was not criminalized. Neither the CCSFRY nor the Criminal Law of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo of 1978 (CLSAPK) defined an assault that did not cause any injury as a crime.
- 286. An assault became penalized only under Article 187 of the CCRK.

- 287. Article 33 Paragraph 1 of the Kosovo Constitution prohibited conviction for an act, which did not constitute a penal offense at the time it was committed, and did not constitute genocide, war crime or crime against humanity according to international law.
- 288. Therefore, pursuant to Article 364 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.1 of the CPCRK and Article 3 of the CCSFRY:
  - S.G. was acquitted of beating Witness B;
  - S.S. and S.J. were acquitted of beating a from ; and
  - S.S. was acquitted of beating the \_\_\_\_\_ from \_\_\_\_\_
- 289. As these actions did not constitute a crime at the time of their commission.

#### ii. Killing of an unidentified by S.L.

290. The actions performed by **S.L.** that resulted in the death of an unidentified \_\_\_\_ met the characteristics of murder as defined under Article 30 Paragraph 2 subparagraph 1 of the CLASPK.

291. \_\_\_\_ acted willfully. The way \_\_\_ proceeded left no doubts that \_\_\_\_ had a direct intent to deprive the victim of \_\_\_\_\_ life.

- 292. \_\_\_\_\_ action was brutal as it was extremely cruel. The panel discerned the cruelty, because the victim was helpless having the hands tied by \_\_\_\_\_ persons guarding \_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_ was fully aware of \_\_\_\_\_\_ fate to come. The victim begged for \_\_\_\_\_\_ life, but the culprit showed no mercy.
- 293. The punishment prescribed by the CLASPK for this kind of murder was at least ten years of imprisonment. Article 38 Paragraph 1 of the CCSFRY determined the maximum length of imprisonment for crimes defined in the Laws of the Yugoslav Federation, republics and autonomous provinces. The maximum term of imprisonment was 15 years.
- 294. This regulation was retained in force by Section 1 Paragraph 1.2 of the UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 of 12 December 1999. Pursuant to Paragraph 1.6 of this Regulation, the penalty that was originally applicable under the CCSFRY to the murder committed in a cruel way was abolished.
- 295. Pursuant to the provisions of the CCK, depriving another person of life in a cruel way constituted an aggravated murder under Article 147 Paragraph 3 and it was punishable with imprisonment of at least ten years or long-term imprisonment. The maximum length of imprisonment was determined in Article 38 Paragraph 1 as twenty years of imprisonment and according to Article 37 Paragraph 2 the long-term imprisonment could last from twenty one to forty years.
- 296. According to the subsequent piece of legislation, i.e. the CCK, the action attributed to **S.L.** constituted an aggravated murder defined in Article 179 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1.4. The prescribed punishment was imprisonment of not less than ten years or lifelong imprisonment.
- 297. The comparison of sanctions shows that the law in force at the time of commission, with modification implemented

by UNMIK Regulation 24/99, was in this case the most favorable for the culprit.

## F. Determination of the punishments

- 298. While determining the punishments for **S.S**. and **S.L**. , the panel kept in mind the purposes listed in Article 41 of the CCRK. The priority was given to the need of expressing the judgement of society for criminal offenses, increasing morality and strengthening the obligation to respect the law. The panel was also directed by the principle of general prevention, having in mind that the judgment should discourage other people from committing criminal offenses.
- 299. The panel followed its obligation to evaluate all mitigating and aggravating factors, as required by Article 73 Paragraph 1 of the CCRK.
- 300. In relation to **S.L.** the panel considered the following factors to be aggravating: he acted flagrantly with blatant disregard for the possibility of \_\_\_\_\_ crime being exposed by the witnesses. It showed that \_\_\_\_\_ level of respect for the law is low. \_\_\_\_\_ behavior was ruthless, merciless and it demonstrated gross disregard towards basic values respected by civilized society.
- 301. As per the aggravating circumstances in relation to **S.S.**, the panel took into consideration the degree of suffering inflicted by \_\_\_\_\_ on Witness A. \_\_\_\_\_ carried on \_\_\_\_\_ criminal intent for extended time and with persistence.
- 302. In relation to both of the accused, the panel took into consideration as mitigating factors the fact that they both reached prestigious and important public positions in Kosovo society after the war, and that they served the public. The panel also took into account that during the

war in Kosovo, they were fighting for their nation against a regime that is considered by the international community as criminal and for this reason condemned.

## G. The costs

303. The trial panel based its decision related to the costs of criminal proceedings on legal provisions quoted in the enacting clause. The extent and proportion between and **S.S.** scheduled amounts that **S.L.** are obligated to reimburse and the total cost of the proceedings has been determined with consideration for the gravity of the charges against them and the number of investigatory and evidentiary actions that were taken in order to prove these charges, as well as the expenses related to expert's opinion on their health status. It was also taken into consideration that S.G. , and A.Z. S.J. , I.H. , J.D. were acquitted of all the charges against them.

Dariusz Sielicki EULEX Presiding Judge

Chiara Tagliani Recording Clerk

Authorized persons may file an appeal against this judgment to the Court of Appeal through the Basic Court of Mitrovicë/a within fifteen (15) days of the day the copy of the judgment has been served, pursuant to Article 380 Paragraph (1) of the CPC.